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ABSTRACT 
Climate change and the vast amount of natural resources in the Arctic region have 
prompted awareness of the need for new policies among Arctic states, including the U.S., 
and stimulated throughout the entire international community a critical assessment of the 
issues regarding the Arctic region.  All of this could result in potential conflict in this 
critical region of the world.  The Arctic’s ice cover as of spring 2010 was the lowest it 
has ever been at that time of year, and it is melting faster than once thought, making it 
possible for the Arctic to have an ice free summer by 2013.  Due to the increase of yearly 
ice melt, the race to extract the natural resources will speed up tremendously in future 
years.  Research shows that the Arctic nations strongly encourage cooperation and are 
currently abiding by the international laws, treaties, and infrastructures in place that allow 
them the most potential to benefit from the Arctic resources.   
However, although the Arctic nations stress cooperation in their official 
statements and diplomatic overtures, they are actually preparing for conflict.  There are 
many potential flashpoints that could cause the Arctic to end in conflict, such as 
territorial disputes, Russia’s dependency on the Arctic, and the militarization of the 
Arctic.  The Arctic region has long been neglected by the U.S; however, due to the 
current situation in the Arctic and the potential for new threats to the U.S. homeland, the 
region is becoming a far more important issue and is gaining the attention of the U.S. 
government.  The major question this thesis will examine concerns the future of the 
Arctic: is it heading for conflict, or for cooperation?  In addition, the state of U.S. security 
with respect to the Arctic will be evaluated, and recommendations for U.S. national and 
homeland security policy will be provided. 
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I. THE SITUATION IN THE ARCTIC  
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Arctic is a vast region that stretches around the globe north of the Arctic 
Circle with the North Pole at its center (see Figure 1).  The Arctic region consists of five 
Arctic littoral nations (hereafter, Arctic nations): the United States (U.S.) (via Alaska), 
Canada, Russia, Norway, and Denmark (via Greenland).1  In recent years, climate change 
and the vast amount of natural resources (an estimated 22 percent of the world’s 
undiscovered oil and gas reserves)2 in the Arctic region have prompted awareness of the 
need for new policies and a critical assessment of the issues regarding the Arctic region 
which could result in potential conflict.  The Arctic’s ice cover as of spring 2010 was the 
lowest it has ever been at that time of year, and it is melting faster than once thought,3 
making it possible for the Arctic to have an ice free summer by 2013 and causing the 
Arctic to be navigable year-round.4  Due to the increase of yearly ice melt, the race to 
extract the natural resources will speed up tremendously in future years.  
Presently, there are territorial disputes and increased military activity that could 
potentially lead to conflict among the countries in dispute.  The need to preserve the 
natural resources and regulate the activity along the sea routes will increase as the ice 
continues to melt at a constant (or increasing) rate.  The current situation raises serious 
concern over national and homeland security issues, due to the Arctic’s proximity to the  
 
                                                 
1 The five Arctic nations being compared in this thesis are the only five nations with coastal borders 
within the Arctic Circle, which include Canada, Denmark (via Greenland), Norway (via Svalbard), Russia, 
and the United States.  Sweden, Finland, and Iceland are also considered Arctic nations but do not possess 
direct coastal borders within the Arctic Circle or claim territory within the Arctic.   
2 U.S. Geological Survey, “90 Billion Barrels of Oil and 1,670 Trillion Cubic Feet of Natural Gas 
Assessed in the Arctic,” July 23, 2008,  
http://www.usgs.gov/newsroom/article.asp?ID=1980&from=rss_home. 
3 ArcticSecurity.org, “Arctic Sea Ice on Track to Record Low,” http://www.arcticsecurity.org/?p=355. 
4 Statement of Scott G. Borgerson, Visiting Fellow for Ocean Governance at the Council on Foreign 
Relations, Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C. (March 
25, 2009), 10. 
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Figure 1. Arctic Circle and the Arctic nations5 
                                                 
5 Figure taken from Arctic Focus, “Arctic Region Facts,” http://arcticfocus.com/arcticregionfacts/. 
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U.S. and the threats that may come from the region once the Arctic becomes more 
accessible to the rest of the world.  The major question this thesis will examine concerns 
the future of the Arctic: is it heading for conflict, or for cooperation?  In addition, the 
future of U.S. policy with respect to the Arctic will be evaluated. 
B. ARCTIC IMPORTANCE FOR U.S. POLICY 
The Arctic region has long been neglected by the U.S; however, due to climate 
change and the increased melt of the Arctic ice, the region is becoming a far more 
important issue and is gaining the attention of the U.S. government.6  An ice-free Arctic 
is becoming a reality faster than once predicted, and as a result, the vast amount of 
natural resources potentially available and the opening of shipping lanes will potentially 
bring new threats to U.S. interests.  Also, once the Arctic becomes more accessible there 
will potentially be a race for natural resources and possible disputes over territorial 
claims.  
Recognizing the potential uncertainty of the future of the Arctic, the U.S. 
government issued a policy with respect to the Arctic region on January 9, 2009. That 
policy is the National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 66 and Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive (HSPD) 25 (combined as one directive), hereafter called the Arctic 
policy.  This document calls for efforts to “meet national security and homeland security 
needs relevant to the Arctic region,” and to “develop greater capabilities and capacity, as 
necessary, to protect United States air, land, and sea borders in the Arctic region.”7  This 
policy calls for the U.S. Senate to ratify the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS) because “it will give the United States a seat at the table when the rights 
that are vital to our interests are debated and interpreted.”8  The most recent National 
                                                 
6 Heather Conley and Jamie Kraut, “U.S. Strategic Interests in the Arctic. An Assessment of Current 
Challenges and New Opportunities for Cooperation,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 
2010, http://csis.org/files/publication/100426_Conley_USStrategicInterests_Web.pdf, 1. 
7 George W. Bush, “National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD 66 and Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive/HSPD 25,” January 9, 2009, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-66.htm, 2–3.  
8 Ibid., 4. 
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Security Strategy makes the same point about UNCLOS, stating that the U.S. “will 
pursue ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.”9   
The UNCLOS defines the rights and responsibilities of nations in their use of the 
world’s oceans, guiding legal cooperation as well as various environmental agreements.10  
The UNCLOS is at the forefront of the Arctic discussion because it is the international 
agreement used to peacefully resolve any disputes or boundary issues related to the 
world’s oceans.  Although the U.S recognizes the treaty as customary international law, it 
is the only Arctic nation that has not ratified it.  Since the U.S. is not bound by this treaty, 
the U.S. is not considered a “States Party,” which is the term used in the treaty to 
recognize those nations that have ratified the UNCLOS.11  In order to make a territorial 
claim or argue a disputed claim, the treaty only recognizes those nations that are in full 
participation.  Heather Conley and Jamie Kraut, from the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, believe that since the U.S. is not a recognized member, the U.S. 
will not be able to gain, 
…equal access and protection to the resource-rich Arctic and secure its 
rights for commercial and military vessels at sea.  Although it is currently 
gathering data to support possible future claims, the United States is 
unable to make territorial claims to Arctic waters or to resolve its 
longstanding dispute with Canada over the status of the Northwest Passage 
without representation in the international bodies of arbitration established 
by the UNCLOS treaty.12   
President Barack Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton support 
ratification of UNCLOS and are committed to working actively to ensure that the U.S. 
ratifies the Convention.  They believe the treaty remains an important piece of unfinished 
                                                 
9 The White House, “National Security Strategy,” (May 2010), 50. 
10 Conley and Kraut, “U.S. Strategic Interests in the Arctic,” 14–15. 
11 United Nations, “The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,” Part 1, Article 1 
(December 10, 1982), 22. 
12 Conley and Kraut, “U.S. Strategic Interests in the Arctic,” 14–15. 
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business.13  The U.S. Senate has been delayed in the passage of the treaty by a few 
Republican Senators who believe the treaty would give away U.S. sovereignty by 
allowing international bodies to have control over U.S. interests,14 providing a way for 
the U.N. to regulate U.S. naval activity and U.S. environmental law.15  According to Ben 
Block, a writer for the Worldwatch Institute, “the opposition from some Republican 
members of Congress is mostly a reflection of their deep-seated distrust of the United 
Nations and other international bodies.”16  To date the treaty has yet to be ratified.    
The Arctic is important for U.S. national and homeland security policy because 
the effects of climate change will make the Arctic more accessible to the rest of the 
world.  It is a vital region for the U.S., offering vast natural resources, the opportunity for 
increased commerce, and the potential for building partnerships with the other Arctic 
nations.   As Conley and Kraut believe, “with greater accessibility to the Arctic region 
and its abundant resources come both new opportunities for multilateral cooperation and 
the potential for regional competition and dispute, particularly conflicting territorial 
claims and managing maritime resources.”17  For example, the Arctic region has the 
potential to become transformed, 
…into a commercial hub fraught both with environmental concerns and 
complex challenges that have direct implications for U.S. national 
security.  The melting of the northern polar ice has dramatically altered 
this once static geographic and oceanic region and is responsible for the 




                                                 
13 Statement of Honorable Hillary Rodham Clinton, U.S. Senator from New York, nominated to be 
Secretary of State, Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Washington, D.C. 
(January 13, 2009), http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_senate_hearings&docid=f:54615.wais. 
 14 Ben Block, “U.S. Leaders Support Law of the Sea Treaty,” Worldwatch Institute, January 22, 2009, 
http://www.worldwatch.org/node/5993.  
15 Bob Reiss, “Cold Hard Facts: U.S. Trails in Race for the Top of the World,” Politics Daily, March 
13, 2010, http://www.politicsdaily.com/2010/03/13/cold-hard-facts-u-s-trails-in-race-for-the-top-of-the-
world/.  
16 Block, “U.S. Leaders Support Law of the Sea Treaty.”  
17 Conley and Kraut, “U.S. Strategic Interests in the Arctic,” 3. 
 6
to oil, gas, minerals, fish, and transportation routes, formerly locked in by 
thick ice, are for the first time becoming accessible and viable sources of 
profit.18   
According to the most recent U.S. Geological Survey, the area north of the Arctic 
Circle accounts for about 13 percent of the undiscovered oil, 30 percent of the 
undiscovered natural gas, and 20 percent of the undiscovered natural gas liquids in the 
world.19  Once these untapped natural resources are discovered, the Arctic has the 
potential for increased pollution, competition and dispute.   
The U.S. Navy and the scientific community are taking climate change and the 
Arctic seriously.  The National Research Council just released a major study, National 
Security Implications of Climate Change for U.S. Naval Forces, which identifies the 
changes that are already under way in the Arctic and calls for action by U.S. naval 
leadership in response.  The Council states that the first area for U.S. leadership action is 
to support the ratification of the UNCLOS.  The report argues that the U.S. Navy is 
constrained by remaining outside of the UNCLOS because it “makes it more difficult for 
U.S. naval forces to have maximum operating flexibility in the Arctic and complicates 
negotiations with maritime partners for coordinated search and rescue operations in the 
region.”20  My thesis helps provide support for the argument of this new study.   
Just as it is important for the U.S. to understand the future of the Arctic’s climate 
and geography, it is important to try to understand the future of interstate relations among 
the Arctic states.  As Conley and Kraut argue, “protracted disagreement among the Arctic 
littoral states could cause individual Arctic nations to become increasingly assertive in 
their resource and territorial claims, which has the potential to lead to the militarization of 
the Arctic.”21  Some believe that this situation is less likely to happen.  However, if it 
                                                 
18 Conley and Kraut, “U.S. Strategic Interests in the Arctic,” 1. 
19 U.S. Geological Survey, “90 Billion Barrels of Oil and 1,670 Trillion Cubic Feet of Natural Gas 
Assessed in the Arctic,” July 23, 2008,  
http://www.usgs.gov/newsroom/article.asp?ID=1980&from=rss_home  
20 National Research Council, National Security Implications of Climate Change for U.S. Naval 
Forces (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2011), prepublication copy, 
http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=12914#toc.    
21 Conley and Kraut, “U.S. Strategic Interests in the Arctic,” 3. 
 7
were to happen, the U.S. is currently not prepared to operate effectively in that region of 
the world, unable to implement its Arctic policy, and unable to make territorial claims or 
resolve territorial disputes.  Many experts argue that until the U.S. ratifies the UNCLOS 
and moves forward with the U.S. policy in the Arctic, the U.S will not become a major 
benefactor from the Arctic.   
The UNCLOS is not the only area where the U.S. may potentially be behind the 
other Arctic nations.  The four other Arctic nations—Canada, Russia, Denmark, and 
Norway—are preparing to access the valuable resources and transportation routes by 
increasing research for ways to tap into the oil and gas industry and to expand shipping 
routes.  Canada has invested over $100 million for research in the Arctic to verify seabed 
and extended continental shelf22 claims.  Several of the same Arctic nations are 
increasing their military activity by increasing capabilities such as commissioning 
vessels, patrolling areas with aircraft, and controlling the borders.  Russia’s competing 
territorial claims of the Lomonosov Ridge, as well as those of the U.S. of the Beaufort 
Sea, are perceived by Canada to be a real and significant threat to its economic and 
sovereign interests.  Also, Canada has moved to “increase its military presence in the 
Arctic and made clear that it will act unilaterally to protect its interests.”23   
Canada is not the only Arctic nation increasing its military presence; the other 
Arctic nations of Russia, Denmark, and Norway are doing the same.  According to 
Charles Emmerson, “Norway already has Special Forces trained to recapture offshore oil 
platforms–coming up from torpedo tubes in submarines, parachuting in from low 
altitudes, or using fast boats and helicopters.”24  The most threatening Arctic nation is 
                                                 
22 According to the UNCLOS, the continental shelf is defined as the “seabed and subsoil of the 
submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land 
territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nm from the baselines from 
which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured where the outer edge of the continental margin does not 
extend up to that distance.” United Nations, “The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,” Part 
VI, Article 76 (December 10, 1982), 53. 
23 Conley and Kraut, “U.S. Strategic Interests in the Arctic,” 16–18. 
24 Charles Emmerson, The Future History of the Arctic (New York, NY: Public Affairs, 2010), 121–
122. 
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Russia because the “nation’s future is so bound up with the development of riches above 
the Arctic Circle.  No other country’s impact on the Arctic as a whole will be as great.”25 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature available to help us understand whether the Arctic is heading 
toward a future of cooperation or conflict, can be viewed as different points on opposite 
ends of a spectrum.  The first viewpoint, that of cooperation, is that all Arctic nations will 
abide by international law for peaceful resolution of territorial disputes, and work 
together to secure the region and deter threats from the Arctic.  Scholars supporting this 
approach agree that the current situation among the Arctic nations will ultimately lead to 
cooperation in the region.  The second viewpoint sees that although the Arctic nations 
may appear to be collaborating to achieve cooperation, they are actually preparing for a 
future marked by conflict.  Supporters of this view note that most Arctic nations are 
developing combat-capable forces in the region, despite their claims that the forces are 
for constabulary roles only.26  This section examines the two ends of the spectrum and 
the existing literature available to answer the question of conflict or cooperation.  
In support of the cooperation viewpoint, Canadian legal scholar Michael Byers 
believes there will be no race for natural resources and no appetite for conflict.  Byers 
believes that the current UNCLOS is at the center of international law in the Arctic and 
that it will be followed by the five participating Arctic Ocean coastal states including the 
U.S., because although the U.S. does not recognize UNCLOS, it does accept it as 
customary international law.  Byers noted that in 2008, Denmark hosted a summit for the 
Arctic Ocean coastal states that culminated with all five countries reaffirming their 
commitment to resolving disputes peacefully within the existing framework of 
international law.27   
                                                 
25 Emmerson, The Future History of the Arctic, 221. 
26 Dr. Rob Huebert, “The Newly Emerging Arctic Security Environment,” Canadian Defence & 
Foreign Affairs Institute (March 2010), 22. 
27 Michael Byers, “Pax Arctica”, GlobalBrief.ca, February 19, 2010,  
http://globalbrief.ca/blog/2010/02/19/pax-arctica/. 
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Another supporter of the cooperation viewpoint, Captain Lawson Brigham, U.S. 
Coast Guard (Retired), professor at the University of Alaska Fairbanks believes, 
…the Arctic region should be one of cooperation, not conflict, with shared 
concern for science, environmental protection, and marine shipping issues, 
all within the Arctic Council.  The structures are in place today to enhance 
cooperation among the Arctic states to protect the marine environment and 
the Arctic people, improve marine safety, and collaborate in the sharing of 
ship traffic and environmental information.  Greater cooperation is 
imperative, and highly possible, in dealing with the future development of 
international rules that should lessen regional disputes and develop a more 
integrated approach to Arctic marine affairs.28   
Dr. Oran R. Young, Director of the Institute of Arctic Studies at the Donald Bren 
School of Environmental Science and Management, University of California, Santa 
Barbara, is also in support of the cooperation viewpoint.  Dr. Young points out that there 
has been considerable media reporting regarding the potential for conflict in the Arctic 
over the abundance of natural resources.29  But Dr. Young’s opinion is that despite these 
exaggerated reports,  
…there are nonetheless good reasons to reassess current governance 
arrangements in and for the Arctic in the light of current developments and 
to think creatively about ways to strengthen Arctic governance to make it 
as effective as possible in addressing issues that can be expected to arise 
during the forthcoming decades.30 
While Young, Byers, and Brigham all argue there are many things that still need to be 
done to preserve the peace in the Arctic, they strongly believe it will not become a place 
of conflict.   
On the other hand, there are a number of prominent scholars who tend to be 
leaning more toward conflict as the future of the Arctic.  Several of these experts study 
the buildup of security and military forces along the Arctic region, and believe these 
forces present dangerous potential for conflict.  For example, Dr. Scott G. Borgerson, of 
                                                 
28 Captain Lawson Brigham, U.S. Coast Guard (Retired), “Navigating the New Maritime Arctic,” 
Proceedings Magazine, U.S. Naval Institute, May 2009. 
29 Oran R. Young, “Whither the Arctic? Conflict or cooperation in the circumpolar north,” Polar 
Record, Volume 45, Issue 1, (Cambridge University Press, 2009), 81. 
30 Ibid., 73.  
 10
the Council on Foreign Affairs, testified before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. 
House of Representatives, stating that “there is reason to worry” in regards to the 
situation in the Arctic.  He based his comment on Russia’s increasingly aggressive 
behavior regarding the military and economic expansion in the region and its belligerent 
foreign policy overall, which he argued should give the other four Arctic nations cause 
for trepidation.  He added that there are a number of sovereignty disputes between every 
Arctic nation that share a physical border and it would be a mistake to assume that all 
these potential flashpoints will remain quiet.31  In a Foreign Affairs essay, Borgerson 
argues that “although the melting Arctic holds great promise, it also poses grave dangers.  
The combination of new shipping routes, trillions of dollars in possible oil and gas 
resources, and a poorly defined picture of state ownership makes for a toxic brew.”32 
Dr. Rob Huebert, Associate Director of the Centre for Military and Strategic 
Studies at the University of Calgary, recently wrote a report entitled “The Newly 
Emerging Arctic Security Environment” in which he examines why the Arctic nations are 
building military forces and capabilities in the Arctic.  He concludes that despite the 
proclamations of cooperation, Arctic nations are developing combat-ready forces for 
protection of national interests.  Also, with the exception of Canada, the other four 
nations have either invested, or will invest, in weapons systems designed to fight wars.  
As he warns, “there is reason to believe that these programs represent a fear that force 
will be needed to protect their interests in the region and that they need to be prepared for 
this.”33  Moreover, Huebert argues that “some of the states are developing their forces 
because they fear their neighbours” and feel the need for an “insurance policy” or “just in 
case” the forces are warranted, which are “contributing to the growing strategic value of 
the region.  As this value grows, each state will attach a greater value to their own 
                                                 
31 Scott D. Borgerson, Statement Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 
Washington, D.C. (March 25, 2009), 14. 
32 Scott G. Borgerson, “Arctic Meltdown Subtitle: The Economic and Security Implications of Global 
Warming,” Foreign Affairs 87, No. 2, (March – April 2008): 63. 
33 Huebert, “The Newly Emerging Arctic Security Environment,” 22–23. 
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national interests in the region.  In this way, an arms race may be beginning. And once 
the weapons systems are in place, states can behave in strange ways.”34 
As noted above, the views of experts on the future of the Arctic can be seen as 
different points on opposite ends of a spectrum.  Heather Conley and Jamie Kraut present 
a view that lies somewhere in the middle of that spectrum.  They too believe that the 
Arctic has the potential for cooperation, especially if the U.S. takes concrete steps over 
the next several years to improve its strategic posture in the Arctic.  However, Conley 
and Kraut do not completely rule out the possibility of a militarized Arctic due to 
resource and territorial claims,35 which could result in conflict among the Arctic nations.  
These scholars believe that the Arctic nations are doing what is currently necessary with 
respect to building and the future plans of building Arctic forces.  Likewise, Byers does 
not “see a military buildup that is directed at state threats in the Arctic.  What I see is a 
perfectly logical response to the constabulary responsibilities that come with a newly 
opened coastline.”36 
Also believing that the Arctic has the potential for competition as well as conflict 
is Admiral James G. Stavridis, Supreme Allied Commander for Europe.  In a recent 
discussion at the Scott Polar Research Institute of the University of Cambridge, Admiral 
Stavridis stated that, 
…for now, the disputes in the north have been dealt with peacefully, but 
climate change could alter the equilibrium over the coming years in the 
race of temptation for exploitation of more readily accessible natural 
resources.”  Adding further, “the cascading interests and broad 
implications stemming from the effects of climate change should cause 
today's global leaders to take stock, and unify their efforts to ensure the 
Arctic remains a zone of co-operation – rather than proceed down the icy 
slope towards a zone of competition, or worse a zone of conflict.37 
                                                 
34 Huebert, “The Newly Emerging Arctic Security Environment,” 22–23. 
35 Conley and Kraut, “U.S. Strategic Interests in the Arctic,” 3.  
36 ArcticSecurity.org, “Arms race in the Arctic?,” April 25, 2010, 
http://www.arcticsecurity.org/?p=287. 
37 Terry Macalister, “Climate change could lead to Arctic conflict, warns senior Nato commander,” 
The Guardian, October 11, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/oct/11/nato-conflict-arctic-
resources. 
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Admiral Stavridis believes that the building of military forces in the Arctic is necessary 
and plays an important role when it comes to commercial assistance rather than 
conflict.38   
It is important to point out that the two viewpoints on the ends of the spectrum 
that are mentioned above do not necessarily stand in stark opposition to one another.  
Authors in both camps point out that cooperation can be achieved if all of the Arctic 
nations act on their stated intention to cooperate.39  Also, most of these authors believe 
that in order for conflict to be avoided, the U.S. needs to play a broader role in the Arctic.  
For example, Conley and Kraut state that the U.S. “must take some very concrete steps 
over the next several years to improve its strategic posture in the Arctic so that over the 
next 40 years the region is a model of regional cooperation and not a zone of potential 
conflict.”40  Borgerson believes that “without U.S. leadership to help develop diplomatic 
solutions to competing claims and potential conflicts, the region could erupt in an armed 
mad dash for its resources."41  It appears that the future of the Arctic will likely be 
determined by the amount of attention and focus the U.S. deems necessary.   
D. HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY 
This thesis seeks to answer the question about the future of the Arctic — will it 
develop into what Admiral Stavridis calls a zone of cooperation or a zone of conflict? It 
examines the current U.S. stance on the Arctic to determine the way ahead for U.S. 
policies and strategies.  There are two hypotheses that will be tested to determine the 
future of the Arctic.   
The first hypothesis to be tested in this thesis is that: if the Arctic nations continue 
to abide by the international laws, treaties, and infrastructures in place, then the future of 
the Arctic will be one of cooperation.  This hypothesis suggests it is important for all 
                                                 
38Macalister, “Climate change could lead to Arctic conflict, warns senior Nato commander.” 
39 Huebert, “The Newly Emerging Arctic Security Environment,” 23. 
40 Conley and Kraut, “U.S. Strategic Interests in the Arctic,” 26. 
41 Arctic Council.org, “An Arctic War is Getting Closer,” March 5, 2008, http://www.arctic-
council.org/article/2008/3/an_arctic_war_is_getting_closer.   
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Arctic nations to work together in order to benefit from the natural resources without 
conflict.  The second hypothesis is that: although the Arctic nations stress cooperation in 
their official statements and diplomatic overtures, they are actually preparing for conflict.  
This hypothesis notes that there are many potential flashpoints that could cause the Arctic 
to tend towards conflict such as territorial disputes, Russia’s dependency on the Arctic, 
and the militarization of the Arctic.   
Gathering data related to these hypotheses threatens to overwhelm the effort by 
the range, amount, and undifferentiated quality of the information available.  In relation 
to the discussions of the conflict/cooperation hypothesis, some organizing criteria are 
needed to distinguish important from unimportant factors; to identify important causal 
relationships; to guide investigation; and to provide an intellectual model of how these 
processes might work. 
It is accepted as a given that all policy confrontations in the Arctic are capable of 
turning into military conflicts because the logic of anarchy is a “self-help” logic, in which 
military violence is the ultimate logic of persuasion.42  However, such imperatives can be 
mitigated by the presence of relationships between states that allow or encourage other 
methods of conflict resolution to be adopted.  In the presence of these relationships, our 
default expectation of a zone of conflict may become a zone of cooperation.  Without 
those conditions, policy conflict may turn into war. 
Such a transition process in interstate relations is generally called a crisis.  It is a 
policy confrontation characterized by threats to major national values; the threat of war or 
major damage to national values; and a shortage of time.43  Whatever the antecedents of 
conflict, the decision to fight is ultimately one of individual and organizations, which is 
why crises are defined as decision points between peace and war.44 
                                                 
42 Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations, 
(Brighton, Sussex, UK: Wheatsheaf Books, 1983), 96. 
43 Omer Goksel Isyar, “Definition and Management of International Crises,” in PERCEPTIONS: 
Journal of International Affairs, (vol. 13 no. 4, 1–48, Winter 2008), 
http://www.sam.gov.tr/volume_xiii_winter08.php, 5.  
44 Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis, (Baltimore, MD: 
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What conditions may transform a policy conflict into war or peace in this way?  
Part of that answer lies in the exact issues and foregoing circumstances which press states 
to violent action, or to cooperation, but since this thesis is looking into the future and 
such details of future conflicts are unknowable, a framework which concentrated on the 
more enduring qualities of states is more useful.  Such a model is provided by the 
distinguished crisis scholar, Charles Hermann.45  He proposes that certain characteristics 
of states and their relationships with each other may incline them in periods of crisis to 
choose cooperative rather than conflictual strategies.  
Hermann proposes eight dimensions for ranking parties to a crisis in terms of 
qualities relevant for the outcome of the crisis.46  First he argues that the presence of 
“reliable, trustworthy, confidential and rapid means of communication” between crisis 
adversaries can decrease the possibility of misunderstanding in a crisis or the incentive to 
act pre-emptively before the situation deteriorates.  Secondly, he argues that “access to 
and experience with conflict resolution mechanisms” can provide viable “escape routes” 
to the alternative of violence.  Thirdly, if some of the interests at stake in the crisis 
promise “non-zero sum outcomes” then the path towards cooperative behaviors may 
become more attractive. The prospect of joint benefits through peaceful outcomes can be 
“one of the most helpful elements for crisis management.  A further consideration is a 
mutual belief in the rationality of adversaries.  Such beliefs make diplomatic bargaining a 
worthwhile activity; a belief that rationality is absent may make “pre-emptive 
destruction” appear to be the only available strategy.  Then Hermann discusses the 
presence of the “valued interdependence of parties on other issues” which are not integral 
to the issues in conflict.  Here is the notion of linkage and interdependence, or mutual 
dependence.  A sixth issue is the availability of non-military instruments of statecraft as 
an alternative to military violence.  The next factor is a “parity of usable military 
resources” between adversaries, which may encourage cooperative negotiation in the face 
of mutual military deterrence.  Finally, there is the lack of access to nuclear weapons 
                                                 
45 Charles F. Hermann, “Types of crises actors and their implications for crisis management,” in 
International Crises and Crisis Management, edited by Daniel Frei, (Farnborough, UK: Saxon House, 
1978). 
46 Ibid., 29.  
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which Hermann believes gives crisis adversaries an incentive to negotiate, whether their 
possession encourages intractability in the nuclear power and a more credible stance in 
refusing to compromise.47  
This thesis examines the two hypotheses, cooperation and conflict, in terms 
derived from the conceptual approach outlined in the previous paragraphs, and argues 
that the future of the Arctic is most likely to be characterized by cooperation, rather than 
conflict.  This finding is largely based on the fact that international law is being followed 
by all Arctic nations and disputes over the Arctic that have lasted decades are now being 
settled.  In addition, this thesis argues that Russia cannot benefit from the Arctic without 
western technology, and the building of Arctic forces is not militarizing the Arctic, but 
simply replacing obsolete ships, aircraft, and technology that will likely be used in the 
Arctic for constabulary roles.   
In addition to examining these hypotheses, this thesis will also assess the 
contribution of U.S. policy, strategies, capabilities, and assets to the future of the Arctic.  
Finally, shortcomings will be identified and recommendations will be made for the way 
ahead for U.S. policy and strategies to make them more efficient and acceptable among 
the other Arctic nations in order to prevent conflict. 
Following this introductory chapter, Chapter II is an analysis of the cooperation 
hypothesis.  It studies the potential for cooperation among the Arctic nations and the 
importance of the Arctic nations working together for a common goal.  In particular, this 
chapter focuses on the international law and institutions of UNCLOS, the Arctic Council, 
and the International Maritime Organization in terms of their role in enhancing 
cooperation among the Arctic nations.  This chapter will address the importance of 
cooperation and show how all of the Arctic nations are cooperating with respect to the 
Arctic through cooperative strategies.  Lastly, the chapter will conclude by discussing the 
recent resolved territorial disputes so that some of the Arctic nations can move forward 
with developing the Arctic without conflict.   
                                                 
47 Hermann, “Types of crises actors and their implications for crisis management,” 29–31. 
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Chapter III is the counterargument, analyzing how the Arctic might tend towards 
conflict.  It focuses on the topics of territorial disputes, the militarization of the Arctic by 
the Arctic nations, Russia’s heavy economical and political dependence on the Arctic and 
its aggressive behavior in promoting Arctic policy.  Each of these topics will be 
addressed through examples to show how the countries are striving for cooperation, but 
are preparing for conflict.  This chapter will also focus on Russia and its impact and 
influence it has on the Arctic region and the other Arctic nations.   
Chapter IV will give special attention to current U.S. policies and strategies 
concerning the Arctic.  The NSPD 66 and HSPD 25 Arctic policy will be examined in 
terms of its contribution to protecting the Arctic region: its abundance of resources, and 
its role in homeland security.  This policy will be discussed further to show the 
importance of ratifying the UNCLOS in order to protect and advance U.S. interests in the 
Arctic.48  Likewise, the views of those who oppose UNCLOS will be examined, 
revealing why the treaty has not been ratified by the Senate.  In addition, the other U.S. 
policies that relate to the Arctic, such as the U.S. Maritime Strategy, “A Cooperative 
Strategy for 21st Century Seapower”, the U.S. Navy’s “Navy Arctic Roadmap” and the 
Department of Defense’s (DOD) 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), will be 
examined to determine what has and has not been implemented.  By examining these 
documents, a clearer picture of current U.S. views of the current situation in the Arctic 
will be presented.  The limitations of U.S. capabilities in the Arctic will be discussed, 
such as the shortage of operating ice-breakers, lack of forward operating bases, and 
limited amount of assets to carry out missions such as search and rescue.  These deficient 
capabilities and assets impede the implementation of the U.S policies and strategies for 
the Arctic.  Lastly, the costs of the U.S. non-ratification of UNCLOS will be addressed.    
Chapter V concludes by viewing the material in the previous three chapters in 
terms of the conceptual framework of Hermann’s theory of crisis outcomes.  This assigns 
priority to a number of the factors described in previous chapters and suggests ways in 
which they may contribute to co-operation in the Arctic of the future.  In particular, the 
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concluding argument focuses on the role of international law, and the central significance 
of the Arctic Council, and other structures that enhance cooperation.  The views of 
experts studied for this thesis and the case studies of current Arctic issues and conflicts 
strongly suggest that warnings about the potential for conflict on the top of the world are 
exaggerated, and that it is most likely that the Arctic nations, including the U.S., will be 
able to resolve their disputes peacefully, and manage Arctic issues in an atmosphere 
marked more by cooperation than conflict.  
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II.  POTENTIAL FOR COOPERATION 
This chapter examines the hypothesis that the future of the Arctic is most likely to 
be one of cooperation.  It does so by examining the following areas of interstate relations:  
international law and its main components; the international institutions of the Arctic 
Council and the International Maritime Organization (IMO); the cooperative strategies of 
the Arctic nations; and most recently, resolved territorial disputes pertaining to the Arctic 
nations.  This chapter also studies the potential for cooperation among the Arctic nations 
and the importance of the Arctic nations working together for a common goal.   
The view of cooperation focuses on international maritime law and in particular 
UNCLOS, which governs the Arctic.  Under UNCLOS, Arctic states are responsible for 
resolving disputes through its international bodies; for regulation of the seabed mining 
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction; and making recommendations on the data 
submitted by coastal states concerning the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 
200 nautical miles (nm).  The UNCLOS and these international organs promote 
international cooperation and observance of international law in the interests of 
maintaining peace and security.49   
Another international body is the Arctic Council, which is an intergovernmental 
forum that provides a means for promoting cooperation, coordination, and interaction 
among the Arctic States.50  Like the Arctic Council, the IMO also promotes cooperation 
by focusing on maritime safety throughout the Arctic.  In addition, this chapter will 
discuss each of the Arctic nations (other than the U.S.51) policies to show how each of 
these policies stress cooperation among the Arctic nations.  Finally, the most recent 
territorial disputes that have been resolved will be reviewed as examples of how the 
Arctic nations are moving forward by encouraging cooperation and following 
 
                                                 
49 United Nations, “The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,” Part XI, Article 138 
(December 10, 1982), 70. 
50 Arctic Council. “About the Arctic Council,” http://arctic-council.org/article/about.  
51 The U.S. policy and strategies will be examined in Chapter IV. 
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international law to develop the Arctic without conflict.  This chapter will show that each 
nation is actively promoting cooperation and following international law in order to 
maximize their benefits from the Arctic.  
A. INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The body of international law most critical for Arctic stability is the 1982 
UNCLOS, which established a legal regime governing activities on, over, and under the 
world’s oceans.52  The UNCLOS is a comprehensive international treaty in which many 
nations united to resolve residual ocean issues that had divided them in the years since 
the first Geneva Convention on the High Seas of 1958.53  It establishes a comprehensive 
legal framework that defines the rights and responsibilities of nations in their use of the 
world’s oceans and its resources, guides legal cooperation, and various environmental 
agreements.54  The UNCLOS is often referred to as the “constitution for the oceans.”55   
The current version of the UNCLOS is the result of the third United Nations (UN) 
Conference on the Law of the Sea which began negotiations in 1973 and was completed 
on December 10, 1982.  That same day, the UNCLOS was opened for signature and 119 
nations signed the treaty.  The treaty entered into force 12 years later, on November 16, 
1994, one year after 60 nations had formally ratified the treaty.  Many nations, including 
the U.S., objected to Part XI of the treaty, which pertains to the deep sea bed mining 
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.  In order to achieve universal participation in 
the treaty, in 1990, U.N. Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar began meetings with 
interested governments aimed at negotiating an agreement.  On July 28, 1994, an 
agreement that amended many of the seabed portions relating to the Part XI of the treaty 
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was adopted by the U.N. General Assembly; it entered into force on July 28, 1996.56  The 
1994 Agreement and Part XI of the Convention were to be interpreted and applied 
together as a single instrument.57 
The UNCLOS defines various levels of maritime jurisdiction.  The UNCLOS has 
provisions relating to the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the continental shelf, the 
exclusive economic zone (EEZ), and the high seas.58  Under Article 76, nations are also 
permitted to assert jurisdictional claims over their extended continental shelves beyond 
their EEZs.59  The five Arctic nations are in principle limited to the exploitation of the 
continental shelf within EEZ out a distance 200 nm from the baseline on which their 
territorial sea is calculated.  The UNCLOS allows the Arctic nations to exploit their 
continental shelf beyond this limit if they can prove that the seafloor’s underwater ridges 
are a geological extension of the country’s own continental shelf.  The purpose of 
extending the continental shelf is that nations can claim a larger portion of the ocean and 
the resources available.  Article 188 of the treaty allows nations to dispute claims to 
ensure nations are not claiming each other’s territories or continental shelves as their 
own.  These provisions clearly prescribe the degree to which littoral nations can exploit 
the undersea resources of the Arctic. 
To date, 160 countries and the European Union have ratified the treaty,60 and out 
of the five Arctic nations, the U.S. is the only nation that has not ratified it, even though 
the U.S. recognizes the treaty as customary international law.   
As stated in the Preamble of the UNCLOS, the nations that sign the UNCLOS are 
encouraged, 
…by the desire to settle, in a spirit of mutual understanding and 
cooperation, all issues relating to the law of the sea and aware of the 
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historic significance of this Convention as an important contribution to the 
maintenance of peace, justice and progress for all peoples of the world.61 
The four Arctic nations that have signed the treaty are bound by this international law 
that allows all States Parties the ability to extend their continental shelves and peacefully 
resolve disputes.  As the Arctic continues to melt, there will be no other international law 
that will be as vital as the UNCLOS in the Arctic, which allows each nation to benefit 
from what is rightfully theirs and encourages cooperation among all participating nations.  
In his paper prepared for the Project on U.S. Global Engagement at the Carnegie Council 
for Ethics in International Affairs, Michael Byers argues that, 
…thanks to international law, there is no race for Arctic resources.  Nor is 
there any appetite for military confrontation.  The Arctic, instead, has 
become a zone of quiet cooperation, as countries work together to map the 
seabed, protect the environment, and guard against new, non-state security 
threats.62 
The next section will describe the international bodies that were established by 
UNCLOS to implement treaty.  
1. Bodies Established by the UNCLOS 
a. Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) 
The purpose of the CLCS is to facilitate the implementation of the 
UNCLOS “in respect of the establishment of the outer limits of the continental shelf 
beyond 200 nautical miles (M) from the baselines from which the breadth of the 
territorial sea is measured.”63  In accordance with article 76 of the UNCLOS, an Arctic 
nation64 must have scientific and technical data that can prove that the seabed is in fact 
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connected to their territorial continental shelf in order for the shelf to be extended.  The 
data to prove their claim is then submitted to the CLSC for recommendation.  The CLCS 
will then make recommendations to the nation that submitted the claim on matters related 
to the establishment of the outer limits of their continental shelf.  The recommendation 
given by the CLCS “shall be final and binding.”65  There is a time limit to how long a 
country has to submit a claim the CLCS.  Once a country ratifies the UNCLOS, it has ten 
years to collect the appropriate information and submit a claim for an extended 
continental shelf.66   The CLCS, along with the UNCLOS, helps delineates which areas 
that belong to each country so there is no discrepancy on which areas belong to whom.  
The CLCS is an important commission since it establishes the limits of the continental 
shelf for each Arctic nation which, if its decisions are accepted, will facilitate cooperation 
among them.  
b. International Seabed Authority  
Another body that was established as a result of the UNCLOS is the 
International Seabed Authority (ISA).  The ISA is an independent international 
organization, established under Part XI of the UNCLOS and the 1994 Agreement, 
responsible for organizing and controlling the exploration for and exploitation of 
resources from the “Area”.67  The ISA members are composed of all States Parties to the 
UNCLOS.  There are two principal organs that establish the policies and govern the work 
of the ISA: the Assembly and Council.  The Assembly, made up of all states who are 
parties to the treaty, is its main organ with the power to establish general policies.  It 
elects members of the Council and the Secretary-General, who heads the Secretariat; it 
sets the budget, assesses contributions, approves the rules, regulations and procedures 
that govern prospecting, exploration and exploitation in the Area; and it decides on 
                                                 
65 United Nations, “The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,” Part VI, Article 76(8) 
(December 10, 1982), 53. 
66 United Nations, “The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,” Annex II, Article 4 
(December 10, 1982), 146. 
67 The “Area” is International Seabed Area defined as the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil beyond 
the limits of national jurisdiction.  The national jurisdiction is 200 nm from the coastal nation’s baseline 
unless it has been extended by the CLCS. 
 24
sharing of mining revenues received by the Authority.68  The Council is considered “the 
executive organ” of the ISA, made up of 36 members, that establishes specific policies; it 
approves contracts for exploration and exploitation of deep-sea minerals by States, 
corporations and other entities; and it establishes environmental standards and exercises 
control over the activities in the Area.69  
The ISA came into force on the same day as the UNCLOS, which was on 
November 16, 1994.  At that time, the U.S. had provisional membership in the ISA and 
its organs and bodies.  The provisional membership was given to the U.S. to allow time 
for the ratification of the UNCLOS and the Agreement.  However, since the Senate did 
not ratify the treaty and Agreement, these documents could not be brought into force for 
the U.S. and the provisional membership expired on November 16, 1998.  Currently the 
U.S. has observer status at the ISA.70  Since the other Arctic nations ratified the treaty, 
they each participate in the ISA, and adhere to its when exploring the area for the 
abundance of natural resources.  
c. International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 
The last body that will be discussed as a result of the UNCLOS is the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea.  Established by Part XV of the UNCLOS, it 
consists of a comprehensive system for the settlement of disputes that might arise with 
respect to the interpretation and application of the UNCLOS.  It requires States Parties to 
settle their disputes by peaceful means.  The system, established by the UNCLOS, 
provides four alternative means for the settlement of disputes: the International Tribunal 
for the Law of the Sea (Annex VI), the International Court of Justice, an arbitral tribunal 
(Annex VII), and a special arbitral tribunal (Annex VIII).  A State Party is free to choose 
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one or more of these means by a written declaration.  If the States Parties in dispute 
cannot agree on the same settlement procedure, the dispute may be submitted only to the 
arbitral tribunal.71   
The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea is an independent 
judicial body established to adjudicate disputes arising out of the interpretation and 
application of the UNCLOS.  The Tribunal is composed of 21 independent judges, 
elected by the States Parties, which have a reputation for fairness and integrity and a 
show of competence with the law of the sea.72  The Tribunal has formed the following 
chambers: the Chamber of Summary Procedure, the Chamber for Fisheries Disputes, the 
Chamber for Marine Environment Disputes, the Chamber for Maritime Delimitation 
Disputes, and the Seabed Disputes Chamber.  The Seabed Disputes Chamber, consisting 
of 11 judges, settles disputes relating to the International Seabed Area.  Any State Party 
may request the Seabed Disputes Chamber to form an ad hoc chamber composed of three 
members of the Seabed Disputes Chamber.  The Tribunal is open to States Parties and, in 
certain cases, to entities other than States Parties (such as an international organization).73   
The international legal regime of the Arctic provides an important set of 
rules and procedures for the international use of the Arctic, and as such will be a major 
factor in guiding Arctic states towards cooperation.  The UNCLOS and the laws 
established within it are formulated to establish strict and clear guidelines with respect to 
areas surrounding the Arctic nations so there is not a disagreement on which areas are 
within the limits of each Arctic Nation.  These laws also prescribe legal behavior for 
states, which reinforces cooperative behavior between Arctic nations while sustaining 
peace and security in the region.  The Arctic nations that participate in UNCLOS abide 
by the international law and are following the procedures in place to claim extended 
continental shelves and to settle disputes.  It is important to note that even though the 
U.S. has not ratified the UNCLOS and its components, it still maintains cooperation in 
the Arctic by working with the other Arctic nations for a common goal.   
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B. REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 
In addition to the UNCLOS and the international laws established within it, there 
are two international institutions, the Arctic Council and the IMO, that promote 
cooperation among the Arctic nations.    
1. Arctic Council 
At the end of the Cold War, it was thought that the Arctic could possibly be 
transformed into a zone of peace.  Therefore, a series of initiatives (e.g. the 1991 Arctic 
Environmental Protection Strategy) were launched to improve cooperation between the 
eight Arctic nations.  The Arctic Council, established in 1996, is the most notable of these 
initiatives and remains today the primary mechanism for regional governance.74  The 
Council is a high level intergovernmental forum that provides a means for promoting 
cooperation, coordination, and interaction among the Arctic States and the Arctic 
indigenous communities and other Arctic inhabitants on non-military matters.  The 
Council focuses on “common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable 
development and environmental protection in the Arctic.”75  The member states of the 
Council are the Arctic five (Canada, Denmark (via Greenland), Norway, Russia, and the 
U.S.), and Finland, Iceland, and Sweden.  The Arctic Council is the only major 
intergovernmental initiative for the Arctic involving all eight Arctic states.76   
The Arctic Council is the “main international forum for cooperation in the high 
north”77 and provides the “most potential for a comprehensive resolution of 
environmental and governance issues in the Arctic.”78  The Council convenes twice a 
year, and the body consists of the member states and six indigenous organizations that are 
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“permanent participants” of the council.79  The scientific work of the Council is carried 
out by six working groups focusing on such issues as monitoring, assessing and 
preventing pollution in the Arctic, climate change, biodiversity conservation and 
sustainable use, emergency preparedness and prevention in addition to the living 
conditions of the Arctic residents.80  These working groups have produced a series of 
important assessments and declarations pertaining to climate change, development, 
resources, pollution and monitoring and assessment of the region’s ecosystems.81  Most 
notably is the 2009 Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment, 
…which highlighted the environmental risks, especially from oil spills, 
but also from “ship strikes on marine mammals, the introduction of alien 
species, disruption of migratory patterns of marine mammals and 
anthropogenic noise produced from marine shipping activity.”  The 
Assessment urged Arctic countries to liaise with international 
organizations, promote the development and mandatory application of the 
IMO guidelines, and harmonize domestic safety regimes.  It also, 
importantly, recommended the development of “a comprehensive, 
multinational Arctic Search and Rescue (SAR) instrument, including 
aeronautical and maritime SAR, among the eight Arctic nations.” 
Reports such as the Shipping Assessment and the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment, 
which reported that the average extent of sea-ice cover in summer had declined by 15 to 
20 percent over the previous three decades,82 are playing an influential role in setting the 
policy agenda in the Arctic and framing issues for consideration at the policy level, both 
within and between states.83 
2. International Maritime Organization 
Much like the Arctic Council’s promotion of cooperation, the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO) was established in 1948 to promote marine safety more 
effectively.  The function of the IMO is:  
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…to provide machinery for cooperation among Governments in the field 
of governmental regulation and practices relating to technical matters of 
all kinds affecting shipping engaged in international trade; to encourage 
and facilitate the general adoption of the highest practicable standards in 
matters concerning maritime safety, efficiency of navigation and 
prevention and control of marine pollution from ships.84 
The IMO spent years negotiating a Code for shipping, but before the document 
was adopted in 2002, it was downgraded to a set of voluntary Guidelines for Ships 
Operating in Arctic Ice-Covered Waters.85  The Arctic Council’s Arctic Marine Shipping 
Assessment 2009 Report urges the Arctic nations to coordinate with international 
organizations, and to promote the development and mandatory application of IMO 
guidelines.86  The IMO “provides important standards for ocean carriers in terms of 
safety, pollution prevention, and security.”87 
The two major international institutions, one regional and the other functional, 
have different focuses: the Arctic Council is primarily concerned with cooperation 
focusing on environmental issues, whereas the IMO is focused on maritime safety 
throughout the Arctic nations.  Nonetheless, the effect of both international organizations 
is to encourage cooperation among the Arctic nations.  They promote policy discussion 
and generate proposals.  They prescribe and legitimize processes for managing the issues 
involved; and they also provide means of adjudication or conciliation in the event of 
differences over the rules and decisions they generate.     
C. COOPERATIVE STRATEGIES 
Beginning in 2005, the Arctic nations began developing policies regarding Arctic 
security with an emphasis on cooperation.  This section will describe the policies that 
reaffirm the commitment of the Arctic nations of Norway, Canada, Russia, and Denmark 
for cooperation in the Arctic.  
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1. Norway 
The Norwegian foreign policy for the High North begins with “one of the 
Government’s most important priorities in the years ahead will be to take advantage of 
the opportunities in the High North.”88  In order to achieve this, the policy stresses 
international cooperation, especially with Russia in all areas regarding the Arctic such as: 
fisheries, petroleum resources, environmental issues, maritime safety, oil spill response, 
and emergency and rescue services.89  Russia and Norway have been in dispute over the 
maritime boundary in the Barents Sea for 40 years, but for the past 30 they have been 
working together to resolve the dispute.90  Section D of this chapter will show the result 
of the cooperation between Norway and Russia and how policies of cooperation reduce 
the possibility of conflict.    
2. Canada  
Like Norway, Canada also is implementing strategies that will align them to work 
cooperatively with the other Arctic nations.  Canada views the Arctic as a fundamental 
part of its heritage, future, and national identity.91  In the mid-2000s, the Canadian 
government recognized that there was a need for a domestic policy for the Arctic in order 
to protect Canadian sovereignty and security in the Arctic.  It was not until July 26, 2009, 
that Canada released its Northern Strategy which “was based on four “pillars,” one of 
which was “exercising Canada’s sovereignty.”92  The strategy stresses cooperation, 
diplomacy, and international law as the preferred approach in the Arctic.  Canada 
continues to work closely with their Arctic partners to achieve the common goals for the 
region.93  In particular, the U.S. 
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…remains an exceptionally valuable partner in the Arctic.  Canada and the 
United States share a number of common interests in the Arctic, such as 
environmental stewardship, sustainable resource development and safety 
and security – including effective search and rescue services.  We have a 
long history of effective collaboration and cooperation with the United 
States and continue to deepen cooperation on emerging Arctic issues, 
bilaterally and through the Arctic Council and other multilateral 
institutions.94 
In August of 2010, the Canadian government released a “Statement on Canada’s 
Arctic Foreign Policy” that articulates Canada’s interest in the Arctic, and how Canada 
will implement its Northern Strategy.95  The Statement identifies that Canada is “working 
with Russia, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Finland and Iceland to advance shared interests 
such as trade and transportation, environmental protection, natural resource development, 
the role of indigenous peoples, oceans management, climate change adaptation and 
scientific cooperation.”96 The statement calls for an increase in military presence in the 
North that shows that Canada is committed to protect the North, but Canada “does not 
anticipate any military challenges in the Arctic and believes that the region is well 
managed through existing institutions, particularly the Arctic Council.”97  
3. Russia 
In a similar fashion, Russia is publically committed to working with the other 
Arctic nations to work toward cooperation in the Arctic.  On September 18, 2008, 
Russia’s president, Dmitry Medvedev, approved its National Security Strategy of the 
Russian Federation until 2020.98  The policy emphasizes the importance of bilateral and 
multilateral cooperation and the need to strengthen good relations with neighboring 
                                                 
94 Government of Canada, “Canada’s Northern Strategy,” 34. 
95 Government of Canada, “Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy,” August 2010, 
http://www.international.gc.ca/polar-polaire/assets/pdfs/CAFP_booklet-PECA_livret-eng.pdf, 1. 
96 Ibid., 24. 
97 Ibid., 26. 
98 Katarzyna Zysk, “Russia’s Arctic Strategy: Ambitions and Constraints,” in Joint Force Quarterly 
(Issue 57, 2d Quarter, April 2010), http://www.ndu.edu/press/jfq-57.html, 104. 
 31
countries, in particular the “Arctic five.”99  Recognizing that climate change will most 
likely continue and open up the Arctic to increased economic and industrial activity, 
Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov stated that “if we do not develop the Arctic, it will 
be developed without us.”100  
The Russian strategy also identifies the need for cooperation with other Arctic 
nations to prepare for the security challenges such as search and rescue capabilities, 
surveillance, and navigations systems.  Russia also:  
…stresses the importance of a continued military presence as essential for 
securing national interests in the Arctic…The document vaguely states 
that Russia needs to maintain a “necessary combat potential” in the North 
and reveals plans to establish special Arctic military formations to protect 
the country’s national interests “in various military and political 
situations.”  The Russian authorities, however, underscore that the main 
purpose of such military preparations is to combat terrorism at sea, 
smuggling, illegal migration, and unsustainable use of aquatic biological 
resources.101    
According to Dr. Katarzyna Zysk, a Senior Fellow at the Norwegian Institute for 
Defence Studies,   
…the Arctic document has confirmed what Russian leaders have reiterated 
with increasing intensity: the region’s importance, first and foremost in 
economic and security dimensions.  One conclusion to be drawn from the 
ambitious economic projects is that Russia, for purely material reasons, 
has an interest in maintaining the region as an area of international 
cooperation and in preserving its most important asset as the country’s 
future economic engine—its stability.102 
The Arctic is of great importance for Russian economic stability and Russia’s strategy 
indicates that Russian leaders believe it is in their best interests to maintain cooperation in 
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the Arctic in order to maximize the benefits the Arctic has to offer.  In order for this to be 
achieved, Russia needs to continue to build relationship with the other Arctic nations to 
maintain cooperation.  
4. Denmark (via Greenland) 
Lastly, Denmark (via Greenland) is also instituting cooperative strategies.  
Greenland, the world’s largest island, is located in the North Atlantic Ocean and extends 
less than 500 miles south of the North Pole.  On June 21, 2009, Greenland was 
designated as a self-governing overseas administrative division of Denmark.  This 
designation allows Greenland to receive a greater percentage of oil and gas revenue and 
management of all domestic affairs.  Denmark retained the management of foreign 
policy, foreign affairs, and security and defense of Greenland.103  Currently, Denmark 
does not have a set policy with respect to the Arctic.  In May of 2008, Denmark 
developed a proposal for a strategy for activities in the Arctic, which expresses 
cooperation, prior to hosting the Arctic Ocean Conference in Ilulissat, Greenland.  The 
conference was held “in response to widespread misreporting about the possibility of 
conflict over seabed resources.”104  The participating countries were the Arctic coastal 
nations of Russia, Norway, Denmark, and the U.S.  It was from this conference that the 
Ilulissat Declaration was adopted in which each country committed to resolve disputes 
peacefully within the existing framework of international law.105 The signing of the 
Declaration “affirmed their aim of keeping the Arctic as a region of peace and 
cooperation and of settling overlapping territorial claims.”106 
As discussed, each of the Arctic nations has begun to develop policies to enhance 
security and collaboration among each other.   This section showed how national interests 
motivate the Arctic nations to work together collectively to take advantage of the 
opportunities in the Arctic.   The implementation of the cooperative strategies shows that 
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each Arctic nation is heading in the direction of cooperation, and if this path continues, 
the Arctic as a whole will be able to operate jointly.  The Ilulissat Declaration endorsed 
this principle when all Arctic nations agreed to settle disputes peacefully and within 
international law. 
The next section will describe the most recently resolved territorial disputes in the 
Arctic, showing that cooperative words have been widely translated in cooperative deeds.  
This shows a clear trend towards cooperation rather than conflict.  
D. SOON TO BE RESOLVED TERRITORIAL DISPUTES IN THE 
ARCTIC?107 
The three examples of the Lomonosov Ridge, the Barents Sea, and the Beaufort 
Sea described in this section strongly suggest that international law and institutions are 
playing a central role in Arctic politics.  These Arctic nations abide by and adhere to the 
international laws that pertain to the Arctic.  This is shown through Canada, Russia, and 
Denmark’s decision to let the CLCS rule on the Lomonosov Ridge, through Russia and 
Norway’s treaty to divide the Barents Sea, and the U.S. and Canada’s cooperation to 
dissolve the Beaufort Sea dispute.  All three disputes were resolved or are soon to be 
resolved peacefully and in accordance with international law as described in article 279 
of the UNCLOS.108   
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Figure 2. Lomonosov Ridge and Barents Sea dispute areas109 
1. Lomonosov Ridge – Canada, Russia, and Denmark 
Canada and Russia have agreed to allow the CLCS to rule on their dispute over 
the Lomonosov Ridge, an undersea chain of mountains rising over 8000 feet above the 
Arctic floor and measuring over 900 nm in length (see Figure 2).110  Both of these 
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countries—and Denmark as well—argue that the ridge is an extension of their continental 
shelf, allowing them to exploit the significant amount of oil and natural gas underneath 
the Arctic floor. Canadian Foreign Minister Lawrence Cannon and Russian Foreign 
Minister Sergei Lavrov “reached an agreement to resolve the dispute over the 
Lomonosov Ridge in the Arctic Ocean based on the UN Convention on the Law of the 
sea, which requires scientific proof.”111  Both foreign ministers said, “They were 
confident their respective country's claim would be upheld.”112     
In 2001, Russia was the first to stake a claim, which included the Lomonosov 
Ridge, in the Arctic in accordance with the UNCLOS.  Russia “submitted a claim to the 
United Nations for 460,000 square miles of resource-rich Arctic waters, an area roughly 
the size of the states of California, Indiana, and Texas combined.”113  The CLCS did not 
approve Russia’s claim for failure to submit original data and requested additional data 
and information to support the claim.114  If Russia is able to scientifically back their 
claim, they would legally control nearly one-half of the Arctic.  Canada and Denmark 
disputed Russia’s claim on the Lomonosov Ridge.  Canada claims that the ridge is part of 
the North American continent and Denmark claims it is a natural continuation of 
Greenland.115    
Canada, Russia, and Denmark have launched expeditions to map the Arctic Ocean 
floor in an effort to provide scientific proof of their claim that the Lomonosov Ridge is an 
extension of their continental shelf.  Russia is expected to submit its data to the UN in 
2012–2013, Canada in 2013, and Denmark by the end of 2014.  Each country is confident 
their claim will win approval. Once all of the data has been submitted, the CLCS will 
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then make recommendations about establishing the outer limit.116  It appears that the 
Lomonosov Ridge will remain an area of dispute until at least 2014 at which point the 
Arctic ice could be at a point that the resources are available to be extracted.  If that were 
to happen, these countries would have to either cooperate and jointly extract the resources 
in the disputed areas or extract the resources with complete disregard to the other nations 
which would create conflict between them.  The three nations’ recent history of working 
together suggest that the latter of two is highly unlikely.     
2. Barents Sea – Russia and Norway 
On September 15, 2010, Russia and Norway settled a 40-year long dispute over 
their disagreement over the maritime border in the Barents Sea and Arctic Ocean (see 
Figure 2).  The treaty was signed by Russia’s president, Dmitri A. Medvedev, and 
Norway’s Prime Minister, Jens Stoltenberg.  It will take effect once both Parliaments 
ratify the treaty.  Prior to signing the treaty, President Medvedev stated, “I believe this 
will open the way for many joint projects, especially in the area of energy,” and the 
Norwegian prime minister added, “this is a confirmation that Norway and Russia, two 
large polar nations, do not have a policy about racing, but a policy about cooperation.”117 
The area in dispute is between the Russian Novaya Zemlya archipelago and the 
Norwegian Svalbard archipelago, which is a “valuable territory in the rush to develop 
petroleum deposits under the Arctic Ocean.”118  The treaty divides the 67,600 square 
mile disputed area nearly in half to each country and “it spells out fishing rights, and 
provides for the joint development of future oil and gas finds that straddle the boundary 
line.”119  Prior to this treaty, “Russian and Norwegian ships have been detained in the 
disputed area on accusations of violating fishing regulations as maritime borders between 
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the two countries remained undemarcated.”120  Once the treaty enters into force, it should 
serve to prevent any fishing vessels from being detained in the future. 
The treaty was supposed to be ratified simultaneously by the Norwegian and the 
Russian Parliaments in mid-December 2010; however, it was delayed by both countries 
until sometime in 2011 due to more time needed to send the treaty through the Parliament 
process.121  Norway ratified the treaty on February 8, 2011, two days before Russian 
President Dmitri Medvedev sent a package of documents pertaining to the treaty to the 
Russian parliament for ratification.  In the documents, President Medvedev wrote that 
“the Treaty with Norway creates positive political and legal conditions for deepening 
cooperation in sectors as fishing and joint exploitation of transboundary petroleum 
deposits.”122  The date for ratification has yet to be announced, but this collaboration 
between the two countries is a step in the right direction towards continued cooperation 
among all Arctic nations.  
3. Beaufort Sea – U.S. and Canada Dispute 
Another Arctic dispute soon to be resolved is between the U.S. and Canada 
concerning the Beaufort Sea,123 which is located between Alaska and the Yukon 
Territory, straddling their common international maritime boundary (see Figure 3).  The 
U.S. argues the land boundary between Alaska and the Yukon Territory does not extend 
into the ocean as a maritime boundary.  The U.S. believes that the maritime boundary is a 
line perpendicular to the Alaskan coast out to 200 nm, while Canada argues that the 
maritime boundary is an extension of the land boundary at 141°W longitude.  The 
difference in boundaries creates a wedge-like area that covers 6,250 nm² (nautical square 
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miles) of potential oil and gas124 that both countries would like to claim. “Canada claims 
an extension of the land boundary into the Sea based on its interpretation of the 1825 
Convention between Great Britain and Russia, which sold Alaska to the U.S. in 1867, 
while the U.S. bases its claim on a laterally boundary line equidistant from the low-water 
line of each country’s coast.”125  This dispute dates back to 1976 when the U.S extended 
its EEZ out to the 200 miles as did Canada in 1977, and the dispute was discovered when 
each country used different lines to extend their EEZ.126   
 
Figure 3. Beaufort Sea dispute127 
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Even though the dispute has been unresolved for over three decades, both 
countries have shown restraint,128 and there have not been any major incidents in the area 
of dispute.  However, there have been diplomatic protests from Canada when the U.S. 
government tried to auction oil and gas leases in the disputed area.  Due to the area being 
in dispute, no bids were received.  In April 2009, Canada also protested when Alaska 
attempted to auction the rights to explore for oil and gas in the disputed area, and again 
four months later when the U.S. government announced a moratorium on commercial 
fishing in the Beaufort Sea, which included the disputed area.129  Due to the amount of 
hydrocarbons available and the need to map the area, Canada and the U.S. have been 
cooperating in the process of determining where the boundary should be located. 
Since 2008, Canada and the United States have been cooperating in the 
mapping of the continental shelf in the northern Beaufort Sea in 
preparation for submitting claims to the UN Commission on the Limits of 
the Continental Shelf. This cooperation has extended to the pairing of 
Canadian and U.S. Coastguard icebreakers which alternate in breaking ice 
for each other, so that sensitive equipment can be used to collect scientific 
information without being disrupted by the noise and vibration caused by 
contact with the ice.130 
This dispute has been going on for quite some time, and in July 2010 Canada and 
the U.S. held quiet negotiations to resolve the Beaufort Sea dispute with the approval of 
the Canadian Foreign Minister Lawrence Cannon and U.S. Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton, and a second meeting is scheduled to take place in 2011 in Washington D.C.131  
The U.S. and Canada have a great deal to gain by resolving this dispute rather than being 
in conflict with one another.  If the resolution of the Beaufort Sea cannot be negotiated, 
the U.S. and Canada are more likely to agree to disagree.   
                                                 
128 Byers, Who Owns the Arctic? Understanding Sovereignty Disputes in the North, 101. 
129 James Baker and Michael Byers, “The Beaufort Sea Boundary Dispute: Identifying and Assessing 
Options,” Michael Byers on Politics, February 25, 2010, http://byers.typepad.com/files/baker-byers-
discussion-paper-25-feb-2010.pdf.  
130 Baker and Byers, “The Beaufort Sea Boundary Dispute: Identifying and Assessing Options.”  
131 Sian Griffiths, “US–Canada Arctic border dispute key to maritime riches,” BBC News, August 2, 
2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-10834006.  
 40
E. CONCLUSION 
There are a number of interstate structures in place which act as motors of 
cooperation in the Arctic.  There is international law, particularly in the form of 
UNCLOS and its established bodies; the Arctic Council; and the IMO.  All are 
instrumentalities of the international governance in the Arctic and all collectively 
promote cooperation among the Arctic nations.  In addition, the cooperative strategies 
implemented by each of the Arctic nations, with the exception of the U.S., were detailed 
along with examples of recently resolved disputes through the governing international 
laws. 
UNCLOS, often called the constitution for the oceans, is the principal law 
governing the Arctic.  In addition, UNLCOS is an international agreement among the 
Arctic nations—excluding the U.S.—that defines the rights and responsibilities of Arctic 
nation in their use of the world’s ocean by guiding legal cooperation.132  Established by 
the UNLCOS are the three bodies of CLCS, ISA, and the International Tribunal for the 
Law of the Sea that each specifically focuses on different aspects the Arctic that emphasis 
cooperation.  The CLCS focuses on the limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 miles, 
the ISA focuses on the resources available in the Arctic, and the International Tribunal 
for the Law of the Sea provides guidance on the settlement of disputes while maintaining 
the goal of cooperation.  Similar to UNLCOS and its bodies, the international institutions 
of the Arctic Council and the IMO share the goal of cooperation in the Arctic.  The Arctic 
Council concentrates on the areas of cooperation, coordination, and interaction among the 
Arctic nations, while the IMO promotes maritime safety, which leads to cooperation.   
Dating back to 2005, the Arctic nations began developing strategies confirming 
their commitment to cooperation.  Each policy implemented by the Arctic nations 
reduces the possibility of conflict by focusing primarily on cooperation.  Examples of 
recent territorial disputes that have been resolved through international law were 
examined, illustrating not only the importance of observing the international laws, but 
also that the Arctic is heading towards cooperation,   
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This chapter examined evidence that the future of the Arctic will most likely be 
characterized by cooperation.  The governing international law regime, the cooperative 
strategies adopted by the vast majority of Arctic nations, and the examples of the 
resolved territorial disputes all provide strong evidence for the hypothesis that the future 
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III. POTENTIAL FOR CONFLICT 
As the counterargument to Chapter II, this chapter examines the hypothesis that 
the future of the Arctic is most likely to be one of conflict.  This view focuses on 
territorial disputes over shipping channels, navigable waterways, stakes to a territorial 
claim, and maritime boundary issues. The territorial disputes may lead to conflict if the 
Arctic nations do not work together to resolve the issues at hand.  Another important 
topic is Russia’s heavy dependence on Arctic oil and gas deposits, an issue that is highly 
problematic.  Russia is at the forefront of this chapter due to the scale of both its 
dependency and its impact on the Arctic, which is greater in both respects than any other 
Arctic nation.133  Then this chapter will address another major issue, the militarization of 
the Arctic by littoral nations.  They are increasing their capabilities and assets in the 
Arctic in order to gain strategic advantage over their Arctic neighbors.    
Before the end of the Cold War in 1991, the Russian government did not allow for 
the possibility of cooperation with capitalist regimes, but supported international 
movements to displace them communism.  Over many decades and in defense of these 
movements, the government maintained massive defensive forces in anticipation of war.  
Has the new government completely moved away from its old doctrine?  In relation to 
the way history and the future interrelate, Charles Emmerson’s book, The Future History 
of the Arctic, states that “the past does not determine the future but molds it.”134  If the 
past is anything like the future, then Russia will likely be aggressive and uncooperative.  
The number of potential flashpoints on this side of the spectrum shows that the Arctic can 
potentially end in conflict unless the Arctic nations work energetically together to find 
cooperative means of conflict resolution.   
The intent of this chapter is to explore the potential for conflict in the Arctic.  The 
first section of this chapter discusses the current territorial disputes between some of the 
Arctic nations, the second section describes Russia’s dependency on the oil and gas in the 
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Arctic, and the third section examines the military capabilities of each Arctic nation. 
There are several major reasons why conflict may occur: first, there are a number of 
unresolved disputes in the Arctic; second, Russia is growing increasingly dependent on 
the Arctic; third, a number of countries are increasing their military and security presence 
in the Arctic.   
A. TERRITORIAL DISPUTES IN THE ARCTIC 
Certain areas of the Arctic are particularly prone to territorial disputes, such as the 
Northwest Passage and the areas between neighboring littoral states where maritime 
boundaries abut against each other.  Each dispute has a differing effect on the Arctic, 
depending on which nations are in dispute, but all will most likely lead the Arctic towards 
conflict. There are currently four Arctic territorial disputes, three of which will be 
discussed below:135 the Northwest Passage dispute between the U.S. and Canada, the 
Bering Sea dispute between the U.S. and Russia, and the Hans Island dispute between 
Canada and Denmark.  If these territorial disputes are not resolved, the end result could 
be conflict.  The U.S. is in two disputes with Canada136 and, as explained in Chapter I, 
the U.S. is hampered in its ability to make a maritime claim or argue a disputed claim 
unless it ratifies the UNCLOS.  As a result, unless the U.S. and Canada reach a bilateral 
agreement, they will continue to be in conflict over the Northwest Passage and the 
Beaufort Sea.   
These disputes represent potential flashpoints between the countries involved, 
especially in the summer months when the ice melt is at its greatest and when 
commercial fishing and shipping are in their peak season.  These disputes, mostly in the 
southern portion of the Arctic, are due to the increasing accessibility of the Arctic and the 
vast amount of natural resources available in the area.  The countries involved in the 
disputes each want access to the different shipping channels, to navigable waterways, to 
stake a territorial claim on a specific area, or to claim international maritime boundaries. 
                                                 
135 The Beaufort Sea dispute between the U.S. and Canada, discussed in Chapter II, is one of the four 
Arctic territorial disputes.  However, both countries are cooperating in the mapping of the Beaufort Sea to 
resolve this dispute in the near future. 
136 The second dispute between the U.S. and Canada is the Beaufort Sea dispute. 
 45
 
Figure 4. Northwest Passage and Hans Island137 
1. Northwest Passage – U.S. and Canada Dispute 
The Northwest Passage (see Figure 4) is a sea route that connects the Pacific and 
the Atlantic Oceans via the Arctic Ocean.  The Passage runs along the northern coast of 
the U.S. (via Alaska) and Canada and offers a route from the Pacific Ocean to the 
Atlantic Ocean.  This direct route is over 4,000 miles shorter than going through the 
Panama Canal.  Canada has long thought of the Passage as “internal waters” since the 
Passage cuts between thousands of Canadian islands.  However, the U.S. considers the 
Passage as an international strait, which means that foreign vessels have a right of “transit 
passage” similar to other straits around the world.138  “U.S. officials say they are 
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following a long-standing position in favor of keeping straits free to all navigation and 
want unimpeded movement of U.S. ships.”139  This has been a long dispute between the 
U.S. and Canada and a serious concern for Canada, due to the rate of the ice melt, 
possibly causing the Passage to be navigable year round by as early as the summer of 
2013.140 
Presently, even though the two countries are in dispute over the Northwest 
Passage, both countries have an agreement that allows travel through the Passage.  The 
dispute dates back to 1969, when the U.S. government sent the SS Manhattan, an ice-
strengthened super tanker, and the United States Coast Guard (USCG) icebreaker 
Northwind through the Northwest Passage as an experimental voyage to see if it was a 
possible route to ship oil from Alaska to the Atlantic Ocean.  The U.S. did not ask for 
Canada’s permission prior to sending the vessels through the Passage because at that time 
Canada was only claiming a three mile territorial sea, and the U.S. did not intend to enter 
Canadian waters.141  Byers writes, “Although permission had not been requested, Ottawa 
granted it anyways, and then sent a Canadian icebreaker – the John A. Macdonald – to 
provide assistance if necessary.”142  The Manhattan became trapped on many occasions 
and required the assistance of the Canadian icebreaker.  In order for the Manhattan to 
safely transit back through the Passage, the Manhattan had to travel through Canadian 
territorial waters and did so with the assistance from the Canadian icebreaker.   
Because of this incident and the fear of pollution from vessel traffic through the 
Passage, the following year, 
…the Canadian government adopted the 1970 Arctic Waters Pollution 
Prevention Act (AWPPA), which imposed strict safety and environmental 
requirements on all shipping within a 100 nautical miles of the Canadian 
Arctic coast.  The Act was, at the time contrary to international law, which 
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did not recognize coastal state rights in the waters beyond 12 nautical 
miles from shore.  Indeed, the Canadian government effectively admitted 
that the Act was inconsistent with international law when, shortly before 
adopting the statute, it modified its pre-existing, general acceptance of the 
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in order to block the 
matter from being litigated there.143 
Consequently, the U.S. protested that the Act was invalid according to 
international law.  However, the AWPPA dispute receded after the adoption of the 
UNCLOS in 1982 in which Article 234 
…allows coastal states to enact laws against maritime pollution out to 200 
nautical miles when almost year-round ice creates exceptional 
navigational hazards….(and prompted) the development of a parallel rule 
of customary international law that binds all countries, including those, 
like the United States, that have not ratified UNCLOS.144 
In 2003, the Canadian government ratified the UNCLOS because the government 
“decided that it was safe to once again accept the jurisdiction of the International Court of 
Justice unconditionally.”145  Furthermore, “the United States has accepted the Arctic 
Waters Pollution Prevention Act, insofar as it recommends that U.S. flagged merchant 
vessels follow the statute’s provision,”146 but has yet to ratify the UNCLOS.  
Controversy rose again in 1985, when the U.S. chose to inform the Canadian 
government rather than asking permission to send the USCG icebreaker Polar Sea 
through the Northwest Passage.  According to Byers, “The U.S. government was clear 
about its legal position, stating that the voyage would be ‘an exercise of navigational 
rights and freedoms not requiring prior notification.’  It suggested that the two countries 
‘agree to disagree on the legal issues and concentrate on practical matters.’”147  The 
Canadian government responded by reiterating that the Northwest Passage was Canadian 
internal waters; however, the Canadian government granted the U.S. permission to go 
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through the Passage.  Consequently, this decision did not go over well with Canadian 
politicians and nationalists who thought that the U.S. was interfering with Canadian 
sovereignty.148   
In response to the Polar Sea controversy, the U.S. and Canada signed the Arctic 
Cooperation Agreement in 1988.  The agreement states that 
…the United States pledges that all navigation by U.S. icebreakers within 
waters claimed by Canada to be internal will be undertaken with the 
consent of the Government of Canada….Nothing in this agreement of 
cooperative endeavour between Arctic neighbours and friends nor any 
practice thereunder affects the respective positions of the Governments of 
the United States and of Canada on the Law of the Sea in this or other 
maritime areas or their respective positions regarding third parties.149 
The Arctic Cooperation Agreement did not resolve the sovereignty issues for Canada, but 
it simply was a formal agreement to disagree on the status of the Northwest Passage.150  
As a result, Canada chose to ignore USCG vessels and U.S. nuclear submarines that 
travel through the Passage.   
As the ice continues to melt, Canada is becoming more concerned with having 
“sole jurisdiction over the Northwest Passage and wants to enforce its own laws on ships 
in the Arctic waters. Canadian officials argue that their authority over the myriad 
channels and straits…is the best way to minimize unsafe ships and accidental spills in the 
pristine North.”151  In 2005, then U.S. Ambassador to Canada, Paul Cellucci, asked the 
State Department to re-examine the U.S. legal position concerning the Northwest 
Passage. “After his term in Ottawa was over, Cellucci made his personal views clear, 
stating: ‘it is in the security interests of the United States that it [the Passage] be under the 
control of Canada.’”152 Cellucci thought that if the U.S. is not cooperating and playing by 
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Canada’s rules, then conflict would erupt, and Canada would increase its security forces 
and limit the amount of activity allowed by the U.S.  However, Cellucci's comments 
prompted the then “U.S. ambassador, David Wilkins, to restate U.S. insistence that the 
Northwest Passage is an international strait.”153  Canada reaffirmed its commitment to 
protect its sovereignty in December 2009, when,  
…Canada’s House of Commons unanimously passed a bill to rename the 
country’s Arctic sea route the ‘Canadian Northwest Passage,’ 
symbolically asserting authority over the disputed waterway and firmly 
claiming it as an internal strait. However, the United States, Russia, and 
the European Union all believe the passage should be considered an 
international waterway.”154 
Throughout the years, the two countries have mostly chosen to ignore their differences.  
However, as their national interests at stake in the Arctic become more important and if 
the dispute over the Northwest Passage is not resolved, it could severely hurt the 
relationship between the U.S. and Canada, leading to conflict in the region. 
2. Bering Sea – U.S. and Russia Dispute 
The dispute between the U.S. and Russia dates back to 1867 when the U.S. 
purchased Alaska from Russia, and the Bering Sea is at the heart of the current dispute.  
In the purchase agreement, the maritime boundaries were not clearly defined, making 
both countries misinterpret the boundary in the Bering Sea. “Because each country 
interpreted the line described in the 1867 Treaty as a straight line, the Soviet Union 
depicted the Bering Sea marine boundary as a rhomb line on a Mercator projection 
whereas the U.S. used a geodetic line on a conical projection.”155  This misinterpretation 
created an area of dispute the size of 15,000 nm², which is the area disputed today.  The 
original maps used to create the maritime border were lost; therefore, the dispute could 
not be resolved without the original maps.  After both countries implemented the 200 nm 
EEZ in 1977, they agreed to respect “each other’s interpretation of the 1867 Treaty as an 
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interim measure, and negotiations began in the early 1980s to resolve the differing 
interpretations.”156  Professor Vlad M. Kaczynski’s study, “U.S.-Russian Bering Sea 
Marine Border Dispute: Conflict over Strategic Assets, Fisheries and Energy Resources,” 
states that the negotiations lasted nearly a decade and ended with the 1990 Maritime 
Boundary Agreement (see Figure 5). 
The 1990 agreement split the difference between the U.S. claim to a 
geodetic line and the Soviet claim to a rhomb line. Although both 
countries ceded territory from their previous claims, the U.S. still 
controlled a far greater amount of area in the Bering Sea than if the new 
agreement had been based on the equidistant line principle normally used 
in international boundary disputes.157 
 
Figure 5. Bering Sea maritime boundary according to the 1990 Agreement158  
The 1990 Agreement was signed by both Russia and the U.S., and the U.S. Senate 
ratified the pact in 1991; however, Russia has yet to ratify the Agreement.159  Russian 
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critics of the Agreement believe that the treaty was hastily negotiated so that it could be 
signed at the 1990 White House Summit.  Also, the critics feel that the Agreement is not 
in Russia’s best interests because of lost fishing grounds, less potential oil and gas fields, 
and a limited area for submarines to operate.160  Even though the both countries are in 
disagreement, there have been very few incidents of controversy in the Bering Sea.  It is 
not uncommon for the Russian fishing vessels to enter U.S. waters to illegally fish, be 
interdicted by the USCG, or be escorted to a U.S. port or away from the fishing grounds.  
For example, on August 1, 1999, the USCG Cutter Hamilton, 
…attempted to seize the Russian fishing trawler Gissar in the Bering Sea 
for fishing in U.S. waters. The Gissar then attempted to return to Russian 
waters, whereupon a boarding team from the Hamilton boarded the 
trawler. Soon thereafter, up to 19 other Russian trawlers surrounded the 
two vessels, thereby prohibiting the Hamilton from taking the Gissar to a 
U.S. port. The Hamilton's boarding crew was removed from the Gissar 
and the Gissar was turned over to the Russian Border Guard vessel 
Antius.161 
The U.S. is using the 1990 Agreement as leverage, and maintains that the Agreement is 
binding and constitutes the maritime border.  According to the U.S. State Department,  
…the United States regularly holds discussions with Russia on Bering Sea 
issues, particularly issues related to fisheries management, but these 
discussions do not affect the placement of the U.S.-Russia boundary or the 
jurisdiction over any territory or the sovereignty of any territory. The 
United States has no intention of reopening discussion of the 1990 
Maritime Boundary Agreement. 162  
As a result, the U.S. will continue to operate on these terms.  Professor Vlad M. 
Kaczynski’s believes that the Russian perspective is that there is not a binding Maritime 
Border Agreement “between the two countries although international law favors the U.S. 
position.  However, absent ratification of the 1990 agreement or other arrangements, this 
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conflict in the Bering Sea will likely continue.”163  Even though this dispute is not an 
issue for either the U.S. or Russia currently, nonetheless, the dispute is present until the 
U.S. and Russia reach an agreement.  This dispute has the potential to be problematic for 
both countries, if Russia does not consider the ratification of the Maritime Border 
Agreement. 
3. Hans Island – Canada and Denmark Dispute164 
The area of concern in this dispute is Hans Island, a small island located in the 
middle of the Nares Strait that separates Canada’s Ellesmere Island from Greenland (see 
Figure 4).  The dispute is between Canada and Denmark over who has the territorial 
rights to this island.  In 1973, Canada and Denmark established a Delimitation Treaty that 
divided the ocean floor between the two countries “down the middle, using an 
equidistance line defined by 127 turning points.”165  Due to the difference of opinion 
concerning Hans Island during negotiations, the island was purposely left out of the 
treaty.  The delimitation line stopped at the low water mark on both sides of the island 
leaving the island unclaimed.  The dispute over Hans Island does not have any 
implications for the location of the maritime boundary between Canada and Denmark; 
however, the island was nearly forgotten about until the early 1980s when Canada issued 
a permit for Dome Petroleum to study the effect of the sea ice being pushed up against 
Hans Island.  The following year, the Danish Minister for Greenland, Tom Hoyem, 
planted a Danish flag on Hans Island.  Canada’s response to the flag planting was to have 
a diplomatic protest.166   
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Dr. Rob Huebert describes the situation in his report, “The Newly Emerging 
Arctic Security Environment,” as such,  
…up until the commissioning of the Danish Thetis class frigates, the 
dispute was characterized by the occasional visit to the island by a 
Canadian or Danish official or scientist.  The two sides would often leave 
a bottle of their national drink as a “claim,” thereby illustrating the good-
natured approach that both sides employed.  Soon after the commissioning 
of Thetis, however, the Danish Government deployed her to Hans Island 
to land troops to strengthen the Danish claim.  This was then followed in 
2003 with a visit by her sister ship the Triton.  The Canadian Government 
responded in July 2005 by flying its Minister of Defence, Bill Graham, to 
land on the island with Canadian troops.  At this point both governments 
recognized that the issue was escalating and met in New York in 
September 2005 and agreed to avoid any further military activity.  Both 
sides now inform each other of any action that they plan to take in regards 
to the island.167 
A joint statement released by Canada and Denmark in September of 2005 stated that both 
countries have agreed to work together in an effort to reach a long term solution to the 
Hans Island dispute and are firmly committed to a peaceful resolution.168   
This incident illustrates that even in circumstances involving allied states 
that are on friendly terms, the addition of new military capabilities can 
often escalate tensions and lead to changes in control. There is little that 
Hans Island offers to either state, yet the issue commanded significant 
attention from the leaders of both states. So even for insignificant issues, 
insertions of new forms of power can be important even among friends.169  
Presently, the dispute has not been resolved and until the dispute is resolved, the 
two countries will continue to claim Hans Island as their own.  These two countries have 
already shown that if a dispute remains unresolved between allied countries there is still a 
potential for conflict.   
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B. RUSSIA’S DEPENDENCY ON ARCTIC OIL AND GAS 
The end of the Cold War led to a severe decline in the Russian economy and 
capabilities in the Arctic.  As a result, the decline in the economy led to Russia’s 
Northern Fleet being cut by 40 percent due to limited amount of money available for 
upkeep170 and Russian Arctic research was put on hold until 2003.171  Ever since the fall 
of the Soviet Union, Russia has been looking for opportunities to restore the nation to the 
superpower status it once boasted.  “As Russia reemerges from decades of economic 
stagnation and considers its national future, the Arctic is, once again, a central focus.  The 
Russian vision of the Arctic is a source of material strength and national power – rather 
than simply a wilderness of ice – remains very much alive.”172  In order for Russia to 
regain its superpower status, it needs the Arctic to become self-sufficient and remain 
abundant with rich resources.   
Due to being the world’s largest gas producer and exporter and the second largest 
oil producer and exporter, Russia is currently an energy superpower.  In order to continue 
being an energy superpower, Russia has identified the extraction of Arctic oil and gas as 
key to the restoration of Russia’s status.173  “Arctic development is essential to Russia’s 
continued status as an energy superpower.  Without Arctic oil, Russia’s output will 
stagnate and decline.  Without Arctic gas, a manageable shortfall in production will turn 
into an unsustainable deficit in its ability to export.”174  However, “Russia’s political and 
economic leadership wants to avoid the over dependency on oil and gas exports that 
ultimately caused the Soviet economy to collapse.  But apart from oil and gas, Russia has 
little the world wants.  Oil and gas represent a greater share of Russia’s national exports 
than for any other Arctic country.”175  In order to achieve superpower status, Russia has 
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to continue to take control of the oil and gas industry with minimal participation from the 
private sector.  Russia believes that Arctic oil and gas extraction needs to be defined as a 
national project led by Russian companies to be used as a strategic necessity and political 
leverage.176 
As a last resort, the Soviet Union attempted to boost its economy in the late 
1980s, and the Soviet oil and gas industry began to open up to foreign companies.  This 
did not save the Soviet Union, but raised the prospect of cooperation between the Soviet 
Union and the West.  In post Soviet Union oil industry, deals and investments with 
foreign companies were made to develop the fields above the Arctic Circle, and it was 
only a matter of time before oil and gas was being produced.  In 1994, U.S. President Bill 
Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin supported “the organization of a Western 
consortium of oil companies — Texaco, Exxon, Amoco, and NorskHydro — to develop 
Russia’s Arctic Timan-Pechora reserves more widely.”177  At the G7 summit of that year, 
the two presidents announced that this project was the top priority in the oil and gas 
sector.178  However, soon after Vladimir Putin came to power in late 1999, he 
implemented his own system in which state power reclaimed the management of natural 
resources for the development of the Russian economy.179  Putin renounced production-
sharing agreements with foreign oil and gas companies referring to them as “colonial” 
and most deals with western oil companies for access to Russia’s Arctic resources have 
been disbanded and most western companies have been forced to relinquish control and 
accept secondary status against Russian companies.180 
The two companies that were on top of Russia’s reassertion of state control on the 
oil and gas industry were “Gazprom and Rosneft – both public companies in which the 
state holds controlling shares and both closely tied to political interests deep in the fabric 
                                                 
176 Emmerson, The Future History of the Arctic, 198–211. 
177 Emmerson, The Future History of the Arctic, 210. 
178 Ibid., 210–211. 
179 Ibid., 202–203. 
180 Ibid., 203–211. 
 56
of the Russian state.”181  In August 2008, Russia’s new President Dmitry Medvedev, 
signed into law that the government can allocate strategic oil and gas deposits on the 
continental shelf without auction to any company as long as that company had five years 
experience working in the Russian continental shelf.  The only two companies that fit that 
criterion were Gazprom and Rosneft.182  However, more recently due to the world 
economic crisis, Russia has began seeking foreign investment for Arctic gas and oil 
development, but Russian companies will retain both ownership and control of the oil and 
gas fields.  The foreign companies will only own a portion of the resources extracted 
from the fields.  For example, the French owned company Total signed an agreement for 
25 percent of the first phase of the Shtokman project which is the building of a liquefied 
natural gas (LNG) pipeline and liquefaction plant.  Norway’s company StatoilHydro was 
signed on for 24 percent of the same project.  These companies will manage the project 
and receive their resources as part of their national reserves.183    
Russia’s control of the oil and gas industry in the Russian Arctic fall within the 
government’s strategy to use those natural resources to promote Russian power and 
influence abroad, especially in Europe.184  The Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) is an international economic organization that supports 
economic and world trade growth.  European gas production is decreasing while demand 
is increasing causing Europe to increase their import dependency to over 50 percent in 
2010.185  The rising demand is expected to see OECD European gas imports to rise from 
its current 197 BCM (billion cubic meters) per annum to 442 BCM per annum by 
2020.186  Also, the European Commission has warned that Europe dependence on 
imported gas could rise to 77 percent by 2020, most of which will come from Russia.187  
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Consequently, the rising demand for natural gas has led many European gas 
intermediaries to enter into or extend long term gas agreements with the Russian 
company Gazprom.188   
Europe’s growing dependence on Russian gas is cause for concern, with 
fears that much needed Russian gas will come with political strings 
attached…Russia’s hand is already strong.  But it has been critically 
strengthened by European disarray.  In the absence of a single integrated 
European gas market, Russia can pursue bilateral deals with favored 
European countries, while excluding those it views as difficult – notably 
the Baltic states, Poland, and Ukraine…Russia can hope to divide its 
European neighbors against themselves and boosts its influence as a 
result.189 
This current European energy dependence is creating an opportune situation for 
Russia; however, Russia must be able to sustain oil and gas production for the long term.  
This long term sustainment can only be done with the production of the Arctic which 
makes production of Russian Arctic oil and gas a strategic necessity.190    
In order to sustain the increased export of gas to Europe, the Arctic will play a 
major role.  By 2020, Gazprom expects half its natural gas to come from the Arctic.191  
Without production in the Arctic, Russia’s oil and gas production will decline, thus 
decreasing their ability to leverage other countries.  Consequently, Russia is expanding 
their study and exploitation of the Arctic to increase oil and gas production to meet the 
growing needs and remain an energy superpower.  The Russian strategy of asserting state 
control over Russia’s natural resources at home while asserting Russian control of supply 
abroad has been successful.  However, how far is Russia willing to go in order to achieve 
energy superpower dominance?  If Russia continues as such, the superpower dominance 
could likely result in conflict in the Arctic as the other countries would like to benefit 
from the abundance of oil and gas as well without having Russian strings attached.     
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C. MILITARIZATION OF THE ARCTIC 
Much like the territorial disputes, the militarization of the Arctic also has a direct 
effect on the Arctic and the Arctic nations.  Because of the extreme weather and ice 
conditions in and around the Arctic Ocean, the Arctic was not militarized until World 
War II.  During the war, the Northeast Passage192 was used mostly by German naval 
vessels to sail from Germany to the Pacific, and they were the first warships to ever use 
that route.  Also, the air space above the Arctic was utilized by U.S. and Canadian long 
range bombers to reach the European and Pacific theaters.  It was not until the Cold War 
that Russia became a major factor in the Arctic when technology gave way for advanced 
weapons systems that were capable of reaching any location in the Arctic to include 
Canada and the U.S.  This lead to the major threats such as the long range bombers that 
flew over the Arctic, nuclear powered submarines that operated in and around the Arctic, 
and the nuclear armed ballistic missiles that would be fired over the Arctic.  The 
deployment of these systems led to a notable defense collaboration with Canada, 
particularly through North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), and a 
substantial nuclear arms buildup between the U.S. and Russia.193  Dr. Rob Huebert adds 
that,     
…in addition to the conduct of war, the maintenance of endurance during 
the Cold War also depended on systems in the Arctic.  Both sides needed 
the other to know that any attack on their homeland would be detected in 
time to launch a counterattack.  The belief was that this would deter either 
side from attacking in the first place; however, in order for this to work, 
both sides needed to have dependable observation systems as far north as 
possible.  Thus, the Arctic was the critical strategic location for both 
fighting a nuclear war and avoiding it.194   
The end of the Cold War brought peace to the Arctic and a shift in focus.  The 
Arctic nations, especially Russia and the U.S., began decreasing their military presence 
and capabilities and focused more on constabulary roles in the Arctic.  The Arctic 
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became an area of cooperation and the thoughts of military confrontation became a thing 
of the past.195  “The focus of all writing on the circumpolar world in the 1990s was that a 
new and cooperative era was beginning; however, as the second decade of the post Cold-
War era began, cracks began to appear in this hopeful future.”196  As previously 
discussed in Chapter II, beginning in 2005, most of the Arctic nations developed policies 
regarding Arctic security.  These policies reaffirm their commitment for cooperation in 
the Arctic, but “view the Arctic as a critically vital region to their own national interests.  
All have stated that they will take the necessary steps to defend their interests in this 
region.”197  In addition, all of the Arctic nations have “either begun to rebuild their Arctic 
capabilities, or have indicated their plans to do so in the near future.”198  This section will 
examine the Arctic nations (other than the U.S.)199 in terms of their recent build-up of 
military capabilities, or at least their plans to do so, in order determine the reasons why 
and if they are committed to cooperation.         
1. Denmark (via Greenland) 
As discussed in Chapter II, Denmark does not currently have a set policy with 
respect to the Arctic.  Denmark developed a proposal for a strategy, which expresses 
cooperation, prior to hosting the Arctic Ocean Conference in Ilulissat, Greenland.  
Despite not having a strategy, in June of 2009, the Danish government issued the “Danish 
Defence Agreement 2010 – 2014.”  This agreement plans for a joint service Arctic 
Command that will combine the Greenland Command and the Faroe Command.  An 
Arctic Response Force is to be established from all armed services that possess and 
Arctic capability in order to increase the Danish expertise in the area.200  The rationale 
behind the establishment of these forces is due the rising activity that “will change the 
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region's geostrategic dynamic and significance and will therefore in the long term present 
the Danish Armed Forces with several challenges.”201   
The new Command and Response Force are not the only areas where Denmark is 
increasing its combat capabilities in and around the Arctic.  In the early 1990s, the 
Danish Navy commissioned four Thetis class frigates capable of breaking ice up to one 
meter thick.  This vessel is capable of carrying anti-air and anti-ship missiles along with 
anti-submarine torpedoes.  They currently do not operate with these systems due to lack 
of funding, but they could be added quickly if needed.202 Similar to the Thetis class 
vessel, but categorized as an offshore patrol vessel, is the Knud Ramussen class vessels 
that were built in 2008 and 2009.   There are two in service that are capable of carrying 
anti-air missiles and anti-submarine torpedoes.  Due to funding, they do not operate with 
these systems, but they can be outfitted if necessary.203 Another ice breaking capable 
vessel in the Danish fleet is the Flyvefisken class patrol craft vessel.  There are currently 
ten Flyvefisken class vessels in operation all of which are multiple missions capable.204  
These vessels can transition into surveillance, guided missile, or mine vessel patrol craft 
quickly by storing these capabilities onboard in compartments.  This vessel is capable of 
carrying anti-air and anti-ship missiles along with anti-submarine torpedoes.205  The 
Danish navy has built two Abasalon class command and support vessels and are currently 
building three Iver Huitfeldt class frigates that are all armed with  anti-air and anti-ship 
missiles, and anti-submarine torpedoes; however, it is unknown if the hulls are ice-
breaking.206 
It is clear that Denmark is building its combat capabilities to operate in the Arctic.  
The plans for an Arctic command, an Arctic Response Force, and the increase in combat 
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capable naval vessels with ice-breaking capabilities show that Denmark is planning for 
conflict in the Arctic.  Their proposed Arctic strategy is cooperation based, but Denmark 
is planning for the worst case scenario.   
2. Norway 
The Norwegian foreign policy for the High North stresses cooperation with 
Russia but “at the same time this policy statement also reaffirms that the Norwegian 
armed forces need to maintain a robust capability in the region”207 just in case their 
relationship with Russia deteriorates.208  Norway’s concern regarding Russian activity in 
the Arctic has given way to an increase in their military capabilities with a focus on 
Arctic security.  Norway has been steadily building a more capable force since the 1990s 
and more recently has increased its combat capabilities.   
Norway’s recent military buildup has a number of important aspects.  First, in 
terms of theater command and control, on August 1, 2009, Norway moved its Operational 
Command Headquarters to Reitan, which is above the Arctic Circle, making Norway the 
first country to have a permanent base in the Arctic.209   In terms of air assets in the 
Arctic, Norway has responded to increased Russian patrols by their long range bombers 
and fighter aircraft, although this is well below the level during the Cold War. Norway 
has two F-16 fighters on fifteen minute standby at the Bodo Air Base to intercept any 
Russian aircraft that enters Norwegian air space.210 In November 2008, the Norwegian 
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of 48 F-35 fighter aircraft as the replacement aircraft for the F-16.211  “With its host of 
next-generation technologies and unprecedented capabilities, the F-35 is the world’s most 
advanced multirole fighter.”212 
Norway has also begun the renewal of its ageing Cold war maritime capability. In 
June of 2000, the government ordered five Fridtjof Nansen-class Aegis frigates to replace 
the aging Oslo-class frigates.  As of January 18, 2011, all of the new frigates have been 
commissioned.213  The Norwegians have also build six Skjold class vessels that are fast, 
stealthy, and missile capable.  All six vessels have been built, but only one has been 
commissioned and is fully operational.214  These vessels are combat capable, carry anti-
ship and anti-air missiles, and a 76mm gun.215  The Norwegian Coast Guard received a 
dual capable ice-breaker and offshore patrol vessel named Svalbard in 2002.  This vessel 
is nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) protected, and its primary operating area is in 
the Barents Sea and the Svalbard islands.216    
The issues of land forces and operational readiness have also been addressed.  
Norway’s northern border is defended by six main stations that guard the border between 
Norway and Russia.  The Elvenes Station houses Norway’s Quick Reaction Force that 
consists of eight soldiers “ready to leave on fifteen minutes’ notice to deal with any 
border incidents.” 217   Since 2006, Norway has conducted four exercises named Cold 
Response, a multi-national exercise whose participants are drawn from NATO and other 
Scandinavian nations.  According to Major General Howes, Commander United 
Kingdom Amphibious Forces, the Maritime Component Commander for the Multi 
National Task Force, ‘the exercise is intended to enhance interoperability between 
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multinational force structures that could be part of NATO and/or UN operations in a 
challenging arctic climate where seconds count and can be the difference between life 
and death.”218 
Norway’s building of Arctic forces and capabilities contradicts their policy of 
cooperation.  Norway is striving for cooperation with Russia in the Arctic, but are 
preparing for conflict.  “Despite statements about how well they cooperate with their 
Russian neighbours, the Norwegians are concerned enough now that they are building a 
significant combat capable force for use in the north should the need arise.”219  Norway 
understands that the best way for them to take advantage of the opportunities in the 
Arctic is through cooperation because, if it were any other way, Norway would have 
difficulty competing against Russia but is taking the necessary steps just in case 
cooperation is not the future of the Arctic. 
3. Canada 
As previously discussed, the Canadian strategy stresses cooperation, diplomacy, 
and international law as the preferred approach in the Arctic; however, the strategy lists 
plans to assert Canadian presence in the Arctic by “putting more boots on the Arctic 
tundra, more ships in the icy water and a better eye-in-the-sky.”220  
 In order to achieve this, the Canadian government plans to establish an Army 
Training Centre in Resolute Bay on the shore of the Northwest Passage.221 It will expand 
and modernize “the Canadian Rangers – a Reserve Force responsible for providing 
military presence and surveillance and for assisting with search and rescue in remote, 
isolated, and coastal communities of Northern Canada.”222   
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Maritime capabilities will be upgraded by establishing a deep water berthing and 
fueling facility in Nanisivik, on the eastern portion of the Northwest Passage, in order to 
support the Canadian naval and Coast Guard presence.223  A new polar icebreaker will be 
built for the Canadian Coast Guard fleet.  The icebreaker, named John G. Diefenbaker, is 
expected to be the largest and most powerful icebreaker in the fleet,224 and the final 
acceptance is anticipated for late 2017.225  Finally, Canada will build six to eight navy 
Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships modeled after Norway’s Svalbard class vessel design.  
These vessels will capable of operating in first year ice and patrol the Northwest Passage 
during the navigable season and its approaches year round.226  The planning for these 
vessels began in 2007; however, due to delays in the project, the design has not been 
completed and it is unlikely the first ship will be delivered by the initial deadline of 2014.  
It is unknown what type of armament this vessel will have.227  
The Canadian government has planned to purchase 65 F-35 strike fighter jets to 
replace the F-18 by 2020.  “Canada has only signaled its intention to buy the F-35 and 
has yet to sign an agreement, but the Conservative government said it intends to begin 
taking delivery in 2017.”228  The purchase of the F-35 has drawn a significant amount of 
political controversy within the Canadian government in particular by the Liberal Party 
that said it would oppose the purchase due to the lack of a competitive tender process.229 
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With respect to surveillance capabilities, the  RADARSAT II satellite, launched 
in 2007, will  provide the Canadian Forces with greater capacity to monitor the Arctic 
and its Northwest Passage and  detect outside activity through imagery.230  In addition, 
the Canadian forces will continue to 
…undertake operations in the North, such as Operation NANOOK, 
conduct regular patrols for surveillance and security purposes, monitor and 
control Northern airspace as part of North American Aerospace Defense 
Command (NORAD), and maintain the signals intelligence receiving 
facility at CFS Alert, the most northern permanently inhabited settlement 
in the world.231  
The Canadian Defense Forces have been conducting Operation NANOOK since 
2007. It is “an annual sovereignty operation that takes place in Canada’s Arctic that 
shows the government’s commitment to protecting and demonstrating control over the 
air, land and sea within our jurisdiction.”232  Operation NANOOK 2010 included 
participation from the U.S. and Denmark “in order to increase interoperability and 
exercise a collective response to emerging cross border challenges.”233  In response to 
NANOOK 2010, a Russian news article considered it “sabre-rattling,” a bold display of 
military power with the implication of possible use because three of the four NATO 
countries that are Arctic nations participated in the exercise.  The article’s author thought 
the exercises were directed towards them, seeing the situation as NATO vs. Russia.234  In 
addition, the Canadian Defence Minister, Peter MacKay, stated that Russia would not be 
invited to join in future military exercises in the Canadian Arctic.235 
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The August of 2010, “Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy” from the 
Canadian government sends a clear message about protecting Canada’s national interests.    
Canada is in control of its Arctic lands and waters and takes its 
stewardship role and responsibilities seriously. Canada continues to stand 
up for its interests in the Arctic. When positions or actions are taken by 
others that affect our national interests, undermine the cooperative 
relationships we have built, or demonstrate a lack of sensitivity to the 
interests or perspectives of Arctic peoples or states, we 
respond…Cooperation, diplomacy and respect for international law have 
always been Canada’s preferred approach in the Arctic. At the same time, 
we will never waver in our commitment to protect our North.236 
Conley and Kraut stated that “Russia’s behavior in the Arctic has left Canada 
feeling that its sovereignty, security, and national interests are being both challenged and 
threatened.”237  Canada currently has the plans in place to build a more capable force to 
protect its sovereignty in the Arctic, but the Canadian government has failed to 
implement its plans for the Arctic as rapidly as promised.  Canada has to encourage 
cooperation, diplomacy, and respect for international law as its approach in the Arctic 
because it has no other choice unless they rely on NATO partners, in particular the U.S., 
to help defend against Russian behavior.      
4. Russia 
“Russia is the most determined and assertive player in the Arctic.”238  Russia’s 
behavior with regards to the Arctic can be viewed as aggressive and unpredictable.  
“Russia’s approach to Arctic affairs has been of two minds and thus sometimes confusing 
and difficult to interpret.  Self-assertive and occasionally aggressive rhetoric has 
alternated with more conciliatory signals and practical compliance with international 
law.”239  For example, in August 2007, a Russian submersible on a research expedition 
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deposited a Russian flag on the seabed of the North Pole as a symbolic act.240  However, 
the leader of the expedition, Artur Chilingarov, thought that it was more than a symbolic 
act by stating, "I don't give a damn what all these foreign politicians there are saying 
about this.  If someone doesn't like this, let them go down themselves…and then try to 
put something there.  Russia must win.  Russia has what it takes to win. The Arctic has 
always been Russian."241  At the same time, Russia is abiding by international law, 
settling decade’s long disputes, and participating in the Ilulissat Declaration with the 
other Arctic nations.   
Russia’s Security Strategy for the Arctic, National Security Strategy of the 
Russian Federation until 2020, emphasizes cooperation but the policy also stresses the 
importance of a continued military presence, the need to “maintain a ‘necessary combat 
potential’ in the North and reveals plans to establish special Arctic military formations to 
protect the country’s national interests ‘in various military and political situations.’”242  
The policy considers the use of military force to resolve competition for energy near 
Russia’s borders or those of its allies: “in case of a competitive struggle for resources it is 
not impossible to discount that it might be resolved by a decision to use military might.  
The existing balance of forces on the borders of the Russian Federation and its allies can 
be changed.”243   
The struggle for resources is not the only area of the policy that identifies a threat: 
The National Security Strategy also asserts that the Northeast Passage is a 
national transportation route under Russian jurisdiction and that any 
nation’s efforts to change that legal status will be seen as a threat to 
Russia’s national security.  Russia perceives this shipping channel as 
potentially developing into the central link in a maritime network 
connecting Europe and Asia giving it significant authority and control 
over a major transport artery.244 
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Russia has many plans to build their combat capability in the Arctic and among 
them is to modernize its Northern Fleet with a major naval build up. Russia has the 
largest and most powerful icebreaker fleet in the world, with 24 icebreakers,245 and plans 
to build three to four third generation icebreakers246 with the first being built by 2015.247  
Of the 24 icebreakers, seven are nuclear powered, including the world’s largest 
icebreaker, the 50 Years of Victory.  In recent years, the Russian icebreakers have begun 
to regularly patrol the Arctic, and the icebreaker fleet is a key to the region’s economic 
development. 248  Moscow has plans to build eight Borei class nuclear powered ballistic 
missile submarines (SSBNs), one of which, the Yury Dolgoruky, has been completed, but 
is not yet in service.  It took approximately 12 years to complete the Yury Dolgoruky and 
the ambitious plan is to have all eight completed by 2015.249  These submarines will be 
armed with 16 to 20 launch tubes for submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) 
Bulava and six torpedo tubes.250  An even more ambitious plan for the Russian 
government is to build five to six aircraft carrier battle groups to be based in the Northern 
and Pacific fleets by 2030;251 build 20 Steregushchy class multipurpose corvettes, two of 
which are currently in service, armed with anti-ship and anti-submarine missiles along 
with torpedoes; and build 20 Admiral S. Gorshkov class frigates, the first is expected to 
be in service by the end of 2011, armed with anti-air and anti-ship missiles along with 
torpedoes.252  
They will also build new strategic bombers, and increase overall military activity 
in the Arctic.  “A new TU strategic bomber to replace the Tu-95MC Bear, Tu-160 
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Blackjack and Tu-22M3 Backfire should be designed by 2017 with production beginning 
in 2020.”253  Furthermore, the Russians plan to establish special Arctic military 
formations to protect Russian national interests.  They will form an Arctic Spetsnaz 
(special purpose force) to support the northern policy and secure the region.254 
In addition to the plans to build a more combat capable force, Russia has 
expanded its military activities in the Arctic since 2007.255  This activity has not gone 
unnoticed by the other Arctic nations.  For example, in 2007, Russia resumed long range 
strategic bomber flights over the Arctic for the first time since the Cold War.  “During 
2007 alone, Russia penetrated Alaska’s 12 mile air defense zone 18 times.”256  Russia 
does not give any advanced notice to these flights257 and, since they began, the U.S. and 
Canadian aircraft have shadowed Russian bombers as they approach Canadian and U.S. 
soil until they turn around and head back toward Russia.258  In addition, soon after 
planting the Russian flag on the seabed of the North Pole in 2007, Russia conducted an 
air force exercise in which it launched cruise missiles over the Arctic.259  Russia’s policy 
emphasizes the importance of cooperation yet Russia maintains an aggressive posture in 
the Arctic.  Conley and Kraut argue that Russia is implementing a two-track approach in 
respect of the Arctic. 
On the one hand, Russia’s increased military activity in the polar regions 
coupled with its stated objectives of a major naval buildup to operate in 
the Arctic suggest that it will be a potentially unpredictable and 
provocative player.  On the other hand, Russia has demonstrated that it 
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claims to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, 
participates actively in the Arctic Council, and has signed the 2008 
Ilulissat Declaration to maximize its economic benefits from a stable 
region.260 
As mentioned, Russia is implementing the measures necessary in order to reap the 
benefits the Arctic has to offer by being aggressive and unpredictable, and will do 
whatever it takes to be the powerhouse of the Arctic.  In order to be competitive with 
Russia, the other Arctic nations are increasing their military capabilities and assets.   
D. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has examined counterarguments to the proposition that Arctic will 
become a zone of cooperation. It has revealed the means by which the Arctic might be 
pushed towards conflict through the unresolved disputes in the Arctic, Russia dependency 
on the Arctic, and an increase of military and security presence in the Arctic.  There are a 
significant number of potential flashpoints that could ignite the Arctic into conflict.  The 
discussion of territorial disputes highlighted issues arising from access to shipping 
channels and navigable waterways, specific territorial claims, and international maritime 
boundaries between and beyond territorial waters.  Also examined was Russia’s 
dependency on the amount of oil and gas available in the Arctic.  Russia’s main focus is 
regaining the status of a superpower by being aggressive and unpredictable in order to 
control the resources in the Arctic.  Russia’s influence and behavior are provocative to 
other Arctic nations and if Russia is not willing to change its approach, the Arctic may be 
headed towards conflict.   
Russia is a potentially hostile superpower in the Arctic, and in order defend their 
claims, the other Arctic nations have increased or plan to increase their military 
capabilities and assets.  This will allow the Arctic nations to be more strategically 
aligned, especially with Russia.  The Arctic nations are building or have plans to build a 
more combat capable Arctic force to protect its sovereignty and national interests in the 
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Arctic.  Conley and Kraut, argue that Russia is not the only Arctic nation that has a two-
track approach, stressing cooperation yet increasing combat capability in the Arctic.     
All Arctic nations have a vested interest in ensuring the Arctic region is 
stable in order to maximize economic gain and benefit; all Arctic nations 
are also keeping their military options open and available for use to project 
sovereignty and to transmit to other nations a sense of claim and identity.  
The difference among the Arctic nations is in the degree and emphasis of 
implementation of the two-track approach.261 
However, Russia is the powerhouse in the Arctic and will aggressively pursue a 
number of tactics to exploit this.   For instance,  
Russia is deploying what it sees as a “win-win” Arctic strategy: gain early 
military and commercial regional supremacy and hope to win equally at 
the United Nations and other multilateral tables.  Other Arctic nations tend 
to place more emphasis on working bilaterally or within international 
governance structures and operating cooperatively with other Arctic 
nations, but all to a greater or lesser degree have or are making military 
adjustments to preserve their options.  The question for the future will be 
if or how Russia will maintain its dual approach, or if it will continue to 
rely more heavily on developing an aggressive defense posture to achieve 
its means and determine the future of the Arctic to its liking.262  
All of these factors—to include territorial claims, Russia’s dependency, and the 
militarization of the Arctic—can potentially lead to conflict in the Arctic.  It all depends 
on which one has the potential to flash and cause the conflict.  Until all of these issues are 
resolved peacefully with all sides in agreement, the potential for conflict will remain.   
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IV. CURRENT U.S. POLICY AND STRATEGIES 
The intent of this chapter is to review the following: the current U.S. policies and 
strategies concerning the Arctic; the U.S. non-ratification of the UNCLOS, and the 
reasons why it has not been ratified; the limited number of U.S. capabilities and assets 
available relating to the Arctic; and finally the gaps within these topics and 
recommendations for the way ahead.  While the previous chapters discussed the policies, 
strategies, capabilities, and limitations of the other Arctic nations, this chapter will 
examine primarily those areas in terms of the United States. 
A. U.S. POLICY 
As described previously, NSPD 66 and HSPD 25 is the current U.S. policy with 
respect to the Arctic, issued on January 9, 2009.  This directive states it is the policy of 
the U.S. to meet national security and homeland security needs relevant to the Arctic 
region, protect the Arctic environment and its biological resources, ensure 
environmentally sustainable resource management and economic developments, 
strengthen cooperation among the eight Arctic nations (which include Finland, Iceland, 
and Sweden), involve the Arctic’s indigenous communities in decision making, and 
enhance scientific monitoring and research into environmental issues.  The directive 
continues to address international governance, extended continental shelf and boundary 
issues, promotion of international scientific cooperation, maritime transportation, 
economic and energy issues, and environmental protection and conservation of natural 
resources in the Arctic region.263  In line with the other Arctic nations’ policies, the U.S. 
policy stresses cooperation but “is prepared to operate either independently or in 
conjunction with other states to safeguard these interests.”264  However, the U.S. policy 
does not specifically state that there is a need to militarize the Arctic but rather that there 
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is a need to “Develop greater capabilities and capacity, as necessary, to protect United 
States air, land, and sea borders in the Arctic region.”265   
The Arctic policy is focused on protecting U.S. sovereign rights, national 
interests, and homeland security interests throughout the Arctic region.  The policy also 
emphasizes the need to prevent criminal activity and terrorist attacks, implement a search 
and rescue capability with multinational cooperation, and increase icebreaking 
capabilities, increase Arctic maritime domain awareness, develop greater capacity to 
protect U.S. borders, encourage the peaceful resolution of disputes in the Arctic region, 
and project a sovereign U.S. maritime presence.  In addition, the policy outlines a 
strategy that requires the U.S. “to assert a more active and influential presence to protect 
its Arctic interests and to project sea power throughout the region.”266  To make this 
possible, the policy advises the U.S. Senate to “act favorably on U.S. accession to the 
U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea promptly, to protect and advance U.S. interests, 
including with respect to the Arctic.”267   
The policy recognizes the Arctic as an area for great economic potential and 
stresses the need to ratify UNCLOS when it comes to extended continental shelf and 
boundary issues.  The policy states that:  
…joining will serve the national security interests of the United States, 
including the maritime mobility of our Armed Forces worldwide.  It will 
secure U.S. sovereign rights over extensive marine areas, including the 
valuable natural resources they contain.  Accession will promote U.S. 
interests in the environmental health of the oceans.  And it will give the 
United States a seat at the table when the rights that are vital to our 
interests are debated and interpreted.268 
On the topic of UNCLOS, the policy concludes with “the most effective way to achieve 
international recognition and legal certainty for our extended continental shelf is through 
the procedure available to States Parties to the U.N. Convention on the Law of the 
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Sea.”269  Likewise, the most recent National Security Strategy makes the same point, 
stating that the U.S. “will pursue ratification of the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea,” in order to successfully cooperate with allies and partners to optimize 
the use of shared sea, air, and space domains. 270 
B. U.S NON-RATIFICATION OF THE UNCLOS   
The U.S. played a leading role in negotiating the current version of the UNCLOS, 
but President Ronald Reagan refused to allow the U.S. to sign the treaty.  The Reagan 
Administration argued that while some provisions of the treaty were acceptable and 
consistent with U.S. interests, the deep seabed mining portion of the treaty was not 
acceptable.271   
The deep seabed mining portion of the treaty consists of Part XI and Annexes III 
and IV.  The Reagan Administration did not think these portions of the treaty were in the 
best interests of the U.S. and cited a number of problems as the basis for not signing the 
treaty. Its provisions, argued the U.S. government “would actually deter future 
development of deep seabed mineral resources, when such development should serve the 
interest of all countries.”272  The Seabed Authority decision-making process “that would 
not give the United States or others a role that fairly reflects and protects their 
interests:”273 and UNCLOS provisions “would allow amendments to enter into force for 
the United States without its approval. This is clearly incompatible with the U.S. 
approach to such treaties.”274  Finally it was argued that the treaty’s “stipulations relating 
to mandatory transfer of private technology (allowed) the possibility of national 
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liberation movements sharing in benefits;”275 and the absence of assured access for future 
U.S. deep seabed miners might hold back the development of these seabed resources.276  
Until the treaty entered into force in 1994, and in order for the U.S. to concur with 
the treaty, changes to the deep seabed portion of the treaty had to be accomplished.  The 
Clinton Administration actively participated in the negotiations of the 1994 Agreement, 
which amended many of the seabed portions relating to Part XI of the treaty.  The Clinton 
Administration was satisfied with the changes and on July 29, 1994, the U.S signed the 
Agreement.  On October 7, 1994, President Clinton transmitted the 1982 UNCLOS and 
the 1994 Agreement to the Senate, where it was referred to the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations.  However, on November 16, 1994, the UNCLOS entered into force 
and on July 28, 1996, the Agreement entered into force, but without U.S. participation.277  
The U.S. had signed the treaty, but the Senate failed to vote on the ratification of the 
treaty.   
It was not until 2004 that the treaty was brought up for debate and all 19 members 
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted unanimously in favor of UNCLOS.  
However, the treaty was never brought to the floor for a vote because then—Senate 
Majority Leader Bill Frist (R-TN) declined to bring the matter to a floor vote.  In 2007, 
President George W. Bush called on the Senate to ratify UNCLOS and the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee voted in favor of ratifying the treaty.  However, as in 2004, 
the vote never reached the floor of the Senate for a vote.278  With the new Congress 
under the Obama Administration, the treaty must be reviewed and passed by the Foreign 
Relations Committee again before it can be brought to the Senate floor for a final vote.  
To date, it has not been determined if the Senate will bring the treaty to the floor for a 
vote.  President Barack Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton support ratification 
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of UNCLOS and are committed to working actively to ensure that the U.S. ratifies the 
treaty.279  Without the ratification of the treaty, the U.S. recognizes the treaty as 
customary international law rather than being a full participant.     
Those who oppose the treaty, as mentioned in chapter one, believe that the U.S. 
would be giving up sovereignty by allowing international bodies to have control over 
U.S. interests,280 which would be the case regarding the Arctic territorial claims being 
submitted to the CLCS.  In an article, “The National Interest and the Law of the Sea”, 
which was written for the Council on Foreign Relations, Borgerson references many 
arguments of the opposition for the treaty.  Borgerson states that “opponents of the treaty 
argue that the convention unnecessarily commits the United States to follow rules 
designed by states hoping to constrain American freedom of action.”281  More 
specifically, Borgerson uses the minority views from the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee (SFRC) Report sent to then—Chairman of the SFRC Senator Joseph 
Biden.282  Within the SFRC Report, the opposing views included “taxes” assessed to 
outer continental shelf activities; fear of judicial activism by the Law of the Sea Tribunal, 
especially with regard to articles relating to land based sources of pollution that are called 
a “backdoor Kyoto Protocol;” and a belief the convention will severely curtail U.S. 
intelligence-gathering activities,283,284 all of which pertain to the Arctic. 
Lastly, Dr. Ariel Cohn, a Senior Research Fellow at The Heritage Foundation, 
believes that there is not a need for the U.S. to ratify UNCLOS because the U.S. can 
execute its Arctic policy without it.   
At present, America is not bound by the treaty’s procedures and strictures, 
but the U.S. is pursuing its claims under international law as an 
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independent, sovereign nation, relying on President Harry S. Truman’s 
Presidential Proclamation No. 2667, which declares that any hydrocarbon 
or other resources discovered beneath the U.S. continental shelf are the 
property of the United States.  The U.S. has shown that it can successfully 
defend its rights and claims through bilateral negotiations and in 
multilateral venues, such as through the Arctic Ocean Conference, which 
met in Greenland in May 2008.285 
As reflected above, the UNCLOS is at the forefront of the Arctic discussion and is 
a major factor when determining the future of U.S. in the Arctic.      
C. OTHER POLICIES AND STRATEGIES 
There are additional strategies that the U.S. can implement that can potentially 
influence the future of the Arctic.  For instance, in October 2007, the U.S. Navy, USCG, 
and U.S. Marine Corps released the U.S. Maritime Strategy, “A Cooperative Strategy for 
21st Century Seapower,” which identifies the uncertainty of the future of the Arctic: 
Climate change is gradually opening up the waters of the Arctic, not only 
to new resource development, but also to new shipping routes that may 
reshape the global transport system.  While these opportunities offer 
potential for growth, they are potential sources of competition and conflict 
for access and natural resources.  Moreover, heightened popular 
expectations and increased competition for resources, coupled with 
scarcity, may encourage nations to exert wider claims of sovereignty over 
greater expanses of ocean, waterways, and natural resources—potentially 
resulting in conflict.286 
The U.S. Maritime Strategy does not identify UNCLOS as the mechanism to 
claim sovereign rights in the Arctic, but rather the strategy calls for the U.S. to “foster 
and sustain cooperative relationships with an expanding set of international partners, and 
prevent or mitigate disruptions and crises.”287  If the U.S were to follow this strategy, 
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then it would likely have to ratify the UNCLOS in order to maintain cooperative 
relationships and give the U.S. the ability to claim sovereign rights in the Arctic thus 
minimizing the potential for conflict. 
The culmination of the Arctic policy and U.S. Maritime Strategy influenced the 
U.S. Navy to develop its “Navy Arctic Roadmap.”288  The roadmap was designed to 
develop future Navy policies, strategies, force structures, and investments related to a 
changing Arctic.289  Additionally, the roadmap calls for the development of cooperative 
partnerships with interagency and international Arctic stakeholders, active and competent 
contribution to safety, security, and stability in the Arctic, acquisition of the right 
capabilities at the right cost and right time to meet combatant commander requirements, 
and a scientific understanding of the evolution of the region.  The roadmap pays specific 
attention to developing the capabilities and capacities to conduct the following missions: 
U.S. Maritime Security, Search and Rescue, Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Response, 
Defense Support of Civil Authorities, Maritime Domain Awareness, Strategic Sealift by 
the Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force, Strategic Deterrence, and Ballistic Missile Defense. 290  
Lastly, the roadmap recognizes the uncertainty of the future of the Arctic and makes the 
same argument as the Arctic policy and U.S. Maritime Strategy: 
While the United States has stable relationships with other Arctic nations, 
the changing environment and competition for resources may contribute to 
increasing tension, or, conversely, provide opportunities for cooperative 
solution.  The importance of the Arctic region is identified in the strategic 
guidance of all Arctic nations; therefore, this roadmap considers the 
requirements for the governance framework provided by the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.291 
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The Navy Arctic Roadmap, along with the Arctic policy and the U.S. Maritime 
Strategy, emphasizes the uncertainty of the future of the Arctic and discusses the 
mechanisms that can be implemented to move forward with a positive outcome in the 
Arctic.  
The latest U.S. official policy is to be found in the DOD’s 2010 QDR.  It aimed to 
further rebalance the capabilities of the U.S. Armed Forces and to ensure that our forces 
are prepared for a complex future.292  With respect to the Arctic, the review states that 
security in the Arctic region is an opportunity to work collaboratively in multilateral 
forums.  Furthermore, DOD must work with the USCG and the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) to address gaps in Arctic communications, domain awareness, search and 
rescue, environmental observation, and forecasting capabilities to support both current 
and future planning and operations.  In order to support cooperative engagements in the 
Arctic, the QDR states that DOD “strongly supports accession to the UNCLOS.”293  
These policies and strategies exhibit many recurring themes, such as the 
uncertainty of the future of the Arctic region, the race for resources and a possibility of 
conflict.  They recognize the need to increase capabilities and assets, increase research 
opportunities, foster cooperation between the Arctic nations, and lastly, that it is critical 
for the U.S. to ratify the UNCLOS to obtain the ability to claim sovereign rights in the 
Arctic.  In order to implement the aforementioned policies and strategies, the U.S. needs 
to have the proper capabilities and assets in place.  The next section will be an overview 
of the current U.S. capabilities and assets available for implementation of the policies and 
strategies.     
D. CAPABILITIES AND ASSETS 
The U.S. is very limited in the number of capabilities and assets available in the 
Arctic region and these limited resources hinder the implementation of the 
aforementioned Arctic policies and strategies.  It is critical for the U.S. to have the 
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capabilities and assets in order to be competitive in the Arctic.  Commander John Patch, 
U.S. Navy (Ret), wrote in his Proceedings Magazine article, “Cold Horizons: Arctic 
Maritime Security Challenges,” that the “current U.S. Arctic forces are insufficient to 
accomplish these new missions, much less standing tasks.”294 
The ability to navigate the Arctic requires double-hulled surface vessels capable 
of breaking the Arctic ice.  The U.S. has a limited amount of vessels in the USCG fleet 
capable of supporting the Arctic missions.  Currently, there are only three icebreaker 
vessels available and two of them, the USCG Polar Star (commissioned in 1976) and 
USCG Polar Sea (commissioned in 1978), have exceeded their intended 30-year service 
lives; therefore, the Polar Star is not operational and has been in caretaker status since 
July 1, 2006.  In FY2009 and FY2010, Congress provided funding to repair Polar Star 
and return it to service for seven to ten years, and the USCG expects the reactivation 
project to be completed in FY2012.  The USCG’s third polar icebreaker is the USCG 
Healy (commissioned in 2000).  Compared to the other two vessels, Polar Star and Polar 
Sea, Healy has less icebreaking capabilities, but more capable of supporting scientific 
research and is used primarily for that research in the Arctic.  The USCG’s proposed 
FY2011 budget does not request any funding in the services Acquisition, Construction, 
and Improvements account for polar icebreaker sustainment or for acquisition of new 
polar icebreakers.295 
In addition to the number of limited operational icebreaker fleets available, the 
U.S. currently does not have a permanent base on the North Slope of Alaska, which 
borders the Chukchi and Beaufort Seas. The USCG established Forward Operating 
Locations (FOL) on the North Slope, in summer of 2008, which employ USCG small 
boats, helicopters, and Maritime Safety and Security Teams to increase maritime domain 
awareness and test capabilities in the Arctic environment.  The FOLs can only operate in 
the summer months due to the weather conditions, lack of logistical support due to 
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distance of the FOLs from civilization, and the lack of shore based infrastructure.296  A 
more robust operational icebreaker fleet and a permanent presence on Alaska’s North 
Slope is essential for supporting U.S. military and civil operations, maintaining U.S. 
presence, and preserving U.S. economic and other interests throughout the region.297  
Alaska is the home of the U.S. Alaskan Command (ALCOM) and Joint Task 
Force Alaska (JTF-AK).  ALCOM is subordinate to U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) 
and JTF-AK is subordinate to U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and both 
commands are headquartered at Elmendorf Air Force Base, Anchorage, Alaska.  
ALCOM’s mission is to maximize theater force readiness for 21,000 Alaskan service 
members and expedite worldwide contingency force deployments from and through 
Alaska as directed by the Commander, USPACOM.298  ALCOM combined forces 
include more than 20,000 Armed Forces personnel from difference branches and 4,700 
Guardsmen and Reservists.  Similarly, JTF-AK’s mission is to, in coordination with other 
government agencies, deter, detect, prevent and defeat threats within the Alaska Joint 
Operations Area (AK JOA) in order to protect U.S. territory, citizens, and interests, and 
as directed, conduct Civil Support, and it is comprised of Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and 
DOD civilian specialists.299  These assets presently allow the U.S. to gain a large 
presence and be considered a driving force in the Arctic, however cold weather and other 
pertinent training for long sustaining missions in the Arctic are lacking.   
In addition to the current missions, the U.S. and Canada have a strong relationship 
and this relationship is reflected in support of sovereignty and territorial defense of the 
Arctic region.  Canada’s experience in the Arctic is beneficial to the U.S. due to the fact 
that Canada has been operating in the Arctic for many years and the bi-national 
relationship allows for a strong presence in the Arctic.  On February 1, 2006, the Canada 
Command was established to act as a single point of contact for Canadian civil authorities 
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seeking Canadian Forces support, as a single military command for domestic and 
continental operations with a focus on Canada as a single theatre of operations, and as the 
operational link with NORTHCOM.  Subsequently, on February 14, 2008, NORTHCOM 
and Canada Command signed a Civil Assistance Plan (CAP) into law.  The purpose of 
the CAP is to provide a framework for the military of one nation to provide support to the 
military of the other nation in the performance of emergency civil support operations.300  
The Canadian Air Force, in conjunction with NORAD, maintains four FOLs where it can 
pre-deploy fighter aircraft or search and rescue helicopters.  This allows U.S. access to 
Canadian Air Force Bases along the Arctic301 and the capability to deploy U.S. troops on 
Canadian soil.302   
This strong U.S.-Canada military partnership helps compensate for some of the 
limited cold-water capabilities, experience, and doctrine that the U.S. currently lacks in 
the Arctic, but there is a great need for more.  The relationship between the U.S. and 
Canada is a solid foundation to build upon in order to combat the national security issues 
that are present or may arise in the Arctic.  It is in the vital interests of both countries to 
continue to work together in coordination to defend, protect, and secure the U.S. and 
Canadian interests in the Arctic.  As mentioned, the available capabilities and assets are 
limited and in order for the U.S to be an equal partner in the Arctic, the policies and 
strategies currently in place need to be updated to make additional resources not only 
available, but accessible when required.  
E. GAPS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
The most evident gap in the policies and strategies described above is the U.S. 
non-ratification of the UNCLOS.  The UNCLOS provides the necessary guidance and 
framework to submit claims to extend territorial boundaries in the Arctic.  Like the other 
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Arctic nations, the U.S. is currently gathering scientific evidence to submit a claim to 
extend the U.S. continental shelf in the Arctic;303 however, the U.S. is currently at a 
strategic disadvantage by not having the legal right to submit claims.  Many experts argue 
that until the U.S. ratifies the UNCLOS and moves forward with the U.S. policy in the 
Arctic, the U.S will not become a major benefactor from the Arctic.   
As a supporter for UNCLOS, Borgerson included in his article for the Council on 
Foreign Relations, a list of issues that damage U.S. national interests by not being part of 
the UNCLOS.  There are a number of issues that apply particularly to the Arctic.  
• The convention is now open for amendment and could be changed by 
countries hostile to U.S. interests if the United States does not participate in 
the process…The longer it remains a nonparty, the more the United States 
cedes its negotiating strength.304 
• The United States cannot currently participate in the Commission on the 
Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLSC), which oversees ocean delineation on 
the outer limits of the extended continental shelf (outer continental shelf - 
OCS).  Even though it is collecting scientific evidence to support eventual 
claims off its Atlantic, Gulf, and Alaskan coasts, the United States, without 
becoming party to the convention, has no standing in the CLCS.  This not only 
precludes it from making a submission…it also denies the United States any 
right to review or contest other claims that appear to be overly expansive, such 
as Russia’s in the Arctic.305  
• The United States is restricted from fully implementing the first-ever national 
Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, which seeks to build 
maritime partnerships for combating emerging threats based on the principles 
established in the convention.306 
• The United States is unable to nominate a candidate for election to the Law of 
the Sea Tribunal and thus is deprived of the opportunity to directly shape the 
interpretation and application of the convention.307 
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• The United States is in a weaker legal position in the opening of the Arctic to 
police new shipping, to contest disputed boundary claims, and to challenge 
Canada’s assertion that the Northwest Passage falls within its internal 
waters.308 
• The United States is unable to fill its permanent seat on the Council of the 
International Seabed Authority and thus to influence this body’s work 
overseeing minerals development in the deep seabed beyond national 
jurisdiction.309 
As shown in this chapter, the opponents of the UNCLOS are no longer as 
concerned with deep seabed mining issues that the Reagan Administration had with the 
UNCLOS.  Now, the opponents argue that the U.S. would lose sovereignty by allowing 
an international body to preside over U.S. issues.  The importance of the UNCLOS with 
respect to the Arctic should far outweigh any of the opponent’s arguments as can be seen 
from Borgerson’s list of how staying outside of the treaty damages U.S. national 
interests.  As a result, the recommendation for immediate ratification is necessary. 
Another potential gap in the Arctic Region, recognized by both the U.S. Navy and 
USCG, is the lack of maritime presence and search and rescue capabilities.  The U.S. 
Navy does not possess the surface vessels required for operations in the Arctic and the 
USCG only possesses three icebreakers, of which, two are operational.  Also, the USCG 
lacks the proper training and equipment such as icebreakers, aircraft, cutters, and 
permanent bases to effectively have a presence in the Arctic. The current relationship 
between the U.S. and Canada helps provide the U.S. with additional capabilities and 
assets, but the appropriate levels needed to be effective year round are still lacking.  In 
order to establish a greater maritime presence and search and rescue capability, the U.S. 
needs to increase the USCG and U.S. Navy budgets to build more icebreakers, establish a 
permanent USCG base on the North Slope, and collaborate with other Arctic nations 
through joint training and exercises.  These relationships can build a greater search and 
rescue capability and strengthen the partnerships with all of the Arctic nations, thus 
encouraging cooperation.   
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The last gap identified, according to Conley and Kraut, is that a national U.S. 
uncertainty about the rate of the Arctic ice melt has led the U.S. 
…into a false sense that there is an abundance of time for it to address 
these pressing issues.  However, it will take a decade or more to develop 
the critical diplomatic, commercial, and military infrastructure in the 
Arctic necessary to ensure strong U.S. leadership. It is now time for the 
United States to implement a strategic Arctic policy that reflects U.S. 
priorities and promotes transparent and cooperative methods of behavior, 
whether that is related to international shipping, oil and gas extraction, 
search-and rescue activities, or fisheries. Without concrete action today, 
the United States will be left behind in this strategically vital region.310  
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V. CONCLUSION AND THE WAY AHEAD FOR THE U.S. 
Climate change, the increased melting of the Arctic ice, and the vast amount of 
natural resources in the Arctic region have focused attention on the region and on the 
question of whether the future of the Arctic will be one of cooperation or conflict.   There 
are a number of structures in place such as the international law, UNCLOS and its 
established bodies, the Arctic Council, and the IMO that govern the Arctic, and all 
collectively promote cooperation among the Arctic nations.  Currently, each Arctic nation 
abides by international law and has implemented cooperative strategies.  This can be seen 
from the recently resolved disputes.  However, there are a significant number of potential 
flashpoints that could ignite the Arctic into conflict.  There are still unresolved disputes in 
the Arctic; Russia is heavily dependent on the Arctic; and there has been an increase of 
military and security presence in the Arctic that could cause conflict.  Each of the Arctic 
nations are promoting cooperation, but are preparing for conflict just in case one of these 
flashpoints ignite.  Is the Arctic heading for conflict, or for cooperation?  Next, this thesis 
will answer the question of cooperation or conflict by reexamining Charles Hermann’s 
model of eight conditions that may facilitate peaceful crisis management.311    
A. CONCLUSION 
The information provided in the previous chapters has provided the information 
needed to answer Charles Hermann’s model.  All of the Arctic states have the ability to 
communicate with each other using “reliable, trustworthy, confidential and rapid means.”  
This communication comes in the form of the UN, IMO, NATO, and Arctic Council, of 
which all Arctic nations are members (with the exception of Russia being a member of 
NATO).  At the forefront of crisis management for the Arctic nations is the UNCLOS 
because it is used to peacefully resolve any disputes or boundary issues related to the 
world’s oceans.  The purpose of creating the UNCLOS was to resolve residual ocean 
issues that had divided nations in the years since the first Geneva Convention on the High 
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Seas of 1958.312  It establishes a comprehensive legal framework that defines the rights 
and responsibilities of nations in their use of the world’s oceans and its resources, guides 
legal cooperation, and various environmental agreements.313  The U.S. is the only Arctic 
nation that has not ratified the UNCLOS, so it is unable to benefit from being a member 
of UNCLOS and must settle any dispute outside the realm of the treaty through other 
means.  Even though the U.S. has not ratified the UNCLOS, it recognizes the treaty as 
international law.  The research shows that the Arctic nations strongly encourage 
cooperation and are currently abiding by the international laws, treaties, and 
infrastructures in place that allows them the most potential to benefit from the Arctic 
resources.  The communication available to the Arctic nations is available and is being 
used to decrease the possibility of misunderstanding or the incentive to act preemptively 
before the situation deteriorates.  
This thesis has provided six examples of territorial disputes—three that are 
considered to have a potential for conflict and three that are likely to be soon resolved.  
Each of the Arctic nations are involved with a soon to be resolved dispute because they 
have the access to international organizations and bodies that enhance cooperation and 
they have the past experience needed for resolving conflict.  The three Arctic disputes 
that may potentially bring conflict to the Arctic are not important enough for either nation 
to go to conflict over.  The Hans Island has no bearing on the outcome of any maritime 
border or natural resources; the U.S. and Canada have a strong relationship and it is very 
unlikely the Northwest Passage will ever bring violence between them; the Bering Sea 
dispute between Russia and the U.S. has not shown any signs of being an issue for either 
country.   
The Arctic nations recognize that each nation is going to benefit from the 
resources in the Arctic, making it a “non-zero sum outcome.”  The question is—how 
much are they going to benefit?  The Arctic has a severe operational environment, which 
encourages international collaboration for a greater economic benefit.  For example, not 
every nation has sustainable ice-breaking or search and rescue capabilities needed to 
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operate effectively in the Arctic.  By collaborating with the other Arctic nations the 
potential rewards far outweigh the uncertainty of conflict.  This can be seen by the most 
recently resolved dispute between Russia and Norway concerning the Barents Sea, where 
each nation benefited, in which the disputed area was nearly divided in half.314  Russia 
recognized the importance of the Barents Sea to the future of their economy and worked 
with Norway to resolve the dispute in order to avoid the possibility of not being able to 
exploit the Barents Sea in the future due to conflict.  In addition, recognizing the 
importance of peacefully resolving disputes, the dispute concerning the Lomonosov 
Ridge will be determined by the CLCS and their decision will be final.  Canada, Russia, 
and Norway are all states parties to the UNCLOS and will accept the decision of the 
CLCS as the new maritime boundary.  The peaceful resolution of these disputes shows 
that each nation is going to benefit from the Arctic and the more cooperative each nation 
is the more benefit they will receive.     
All of the Arctic nations have proven to be rational actors with regards to the 
Arctic.  However, of all the Arctic nations, Russia stands out as the most threatening and 
most likely to initiate conflict if they are not in control of the region or if they feel 
threatened by the other Arctic nations impeding on their progress in the Arctic.  Russia’s 
history is not in their favor and the fact that Russia is being aggressive and unpredictable, 
and will do whatever it takes to be the powerhouse of the Arctic does not sit well with the 
other Arctic nations.  Based on the information in this thesis, it seems that Russia is the 
“wildcard,” and that the future of the Arctic is based on whether they are willing to 
cooperate peacefully with the other Arctic nations, or continue to be aggressive regarding 
the military and economic expansion in the region, in order to take what they believe is 
rightfully theirs based on their 2001 Arctic claim and 2007 planting of the Russian flag 
on the seabed of the North Pole.  It is in Russia’s best interest to cooperate in the Arctic 
because of their heavy reliance on Arctic resources and their inability to produce the 
increasing amount of oil and gas needed to maintain their energy superpower status.  
They do not possess the ability to do it by themselves.   
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Outside the realm of conflict the Arctic nations are bound together through 
UNCLOS (with the exception of the U.S.), IMO, Arctic Council, UN, NATO (with the 
exception of Russia), and the Ilulissat Declaration with regards to the Arctic.  Most Arctic 
nations have teamed up to conduct research; for example, Russia and Norway are 
mapping the Barents Sea as a combined effort.315  In addition, Canada and the U.S. have 
combined to map the Beaufort Sea and Canada and Denmark are working together to 
map the region around Hans Island.     
As previously discussed, there are many non-military instruments such as the 
UNCLOS, IMO, Arctic Council, UN, and NATO, which enhance cooperation as an 
alternative to military violence.    
Chapter III described the militarization of the Arctic and listed some of the 
resources the Arctic nations possess or plan to possess in the future.  With regards to 
military activity in the Arctic, Russia stands out as the most capable.  The U.S. has a 
more capable military overall, but not much of its military is capable of operating in the 
Arctic.  Even though Russia does not have the military force it once had during the Cold 
War, it is still more capable than any Arctic nation.  They have 24 ice-breakers, 27 
nuclear powered submarines in its Northern Fleet,316 and plans to build 8 more SSBNs by 
2015 and five or six aircraft carriers by 2030.317  There is not a “parity of usable military 
resources” when comparing the Arctic nations.  The other Arctic nations, such as 
Norway, are building their military capabilities in response to Russia’s building of force 
as an “insurance policy” or “just in case” the forces are warranted to fight against 
Russia.318  Russia’s plan to build their military capabilities in the Arctic is ambitious and 
unlikely to come to fruition as they have planned.  The delays in the building of the 
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submarines and ships and the need for Russia to invest their money into the infrastructure 
and technology needed to sustain their energy dominance will likely lesson the perceived 
threat that has been exaggerated by the other Arctic nations.    
The only Arctic nations that have nuclear weapons are the U.S. and Russia.  
Hermann wrote his article in the middle of the Cold War, when possessing nuclear 
weapons provided adversaries an incentive to negotiate.  That may still be practical 
today, but the resources in the Arctic themselves can be the weapon that gives the 
adversaries an incentive to negotiate.  Russia controls at least 50 percent of the oil and 
gas that is exported to Europe.319  Europe’s dependency on that oil and gas is expected to 
increase to 77 percent by 2020,320 which gives the Russians ability to leverage other 
countries.  However, this long term sustainment of oil and gas production from Russia 
can only be done with the production of the Arctic.321  Russia has shown that it is 
incapable of extracting the amounts of oil and gas needed without the help of foreign 
investment.322  Russia is an energy superpower but in order for it to maintain that status, 
they will need the help of capitalist regimes.     
Based on Hermann’s model, the future of the Arctic is likely to be one of 
cooperation.  This finding is largely based on the fact that the Arctic nations abide by the 
international law, participate in the Arctic Council and other structures that enhance 
cooperation, and disputes that have lasted decades are now being settled.  Each nation 
developed Arctic strategies that confirmed their commitment to cooperation, which 
reduces the possibility of conflict.  In addition, Russia is unable to benefit from the Arctic 
without western technology, and the building of Arctic forces is not militarizing the 
Arctic, but simply preparing for potential outside threats that may arise from the opening 
of the Arctic and replacing obsolete ships, aircraft, and technology that will likely be used 
in the Arctic for constabulary roles.323  Out of the eight dimensions of Hermann’s model, 
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only one was answered negatively and that was labeling Russia as possibly being an 
irrational actor based on their past and aggressive and unpredictable behavior. 
B. THE WAY AHEAD FOR THE U.S. 
The Arctic region has long been neglected by the U.S; however, due to the current 
situation in the Arctic, the region is becoming a far more important issue and is gaining 
the attention of the U.S. government.324  This prompted the U.S. government to issue an 
Arctic policy with respect to the Arctic, the NSPD/HSPD.  However, the U.S is currently 
not prepared to operate in that region of the world effectively, unable to implement its 
Arctic policy, and unable to make territorial claims or resolve territorial disputes.  A 
critical assessment of the policies and strategies relevant to the capabilities and assets of 
the Arctic region is crucial.  The U.S. policies and strategies have identified what should 
be done with respect to the U.S. interests in the Arctic, but these policies and strategies 
have not been implemented efficiently.  There is not an abundance of time before the 
Arctic becomes ice-free and it is imperative that the U.S address its issues and move 
forward and implement its “Arctic policy that reflects U.S. priorities and promotes 
transparent and cooperative methods of behavior.”325  
Currently, the U.S. has limited capabilities and assets and, in order to be prepared 
for the future of the Arctic like the other four Arctic nations, the U.S. should seek 
opportunities to expand the operating capabilities and assets in the Arctic.  The U.S. 
policies and strategies stress cooperation and it is apparent that the U.S. cannot achieve 
success in the Arctic without the cooperation of the other Arctic nations.  In addition, the 
U.S. also needs to minimize the gaps, most importantly, ratifying the UNCLOS as well as 
continuing to build the relationships with the other Arctic nations, especially with Russia. 
As previously described, the future of the Arctic is most likely to be characterized 
by cooperation, rather than conflict.  With the exception of Russia, the Arctic nations are 
clearly more interested in cooperation than conflict.  Russia’s behavior can be viewed as 
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aggressive and unpredictable.  With that in mind, the U.S. policy needs to reflect those 
two findings—the future of the Arctic is likely to be one of cooperation, but the position 
of Russia is still a major area of uncertainty.  The U.S. needs to show that it is willing to 
be cooperative in the Arctic, and ratifying UNCLOS allows the U.S. to join the global 
community to encourage cooperation in the Arctic.   
However, the U.S. should hedge their bets when it comes to Arctic and establish a 
greater maritime presence in the Arctic by developing ice-breaking capabilities, 
especially for the Coast Guard, but also the Navy.  The U.S. needs to increase the USCG 
and U.S. Navy budgets to build those ice-breakers, increase Arctic training, establish a 
permanent USCG base on the North Slope, and collaborate with other Arctic nations 
through joint training and exercises.  The U.S. should collaborate with the other Arctic 
nations, increase research, and build the framework needed for a greater search and 
rescue capability.  In the words of Conley and Kraut, “Without concrete action today, the 
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